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I 
INTRDDUCTION 
THE SUPREME COURT : 
The Supreme Court - t h e n a t i o n a l symbol of j u s t i c e , 
s t a n d s a t t h e ve ry p i n n a c l e of t h e j u d i c i a r y , t h e r e i s no 
h i g h e r cour t and a l l o t h e r s bow b e f o r e i t o r a t l e a s t are 
expec ted t o do s o . I t has r e a l power t o b r ing t h e Pres iden t , 
S t a t e Governors , M i n i s t e r s and L e g i s l a t o r s t o f a l l . The 
d e c i s i o n of t h e Supreme Court i s b i n d i n g upon a l l t h e courts 
i n Ind ia as we l l as on t h e E x e c u t i v e , L e g i s l a t i v e and Adminis-
t r a t i v e l imbs of t h e S t a t e . I t s d e c i s i o n i s law and has to 
be enforced by t h e execu t ive and a l l a u t h o r i t i e s a re enjoined 
u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n t o help i n t h e enforcement of i t s 
d e c i s i o n s . I t s d e c i s i o n s can not be changed but i t s effect 
can be l i m i t e d by new l e g i s l a t i o n of t h e Par l iament or 
l e g i s l a t u r e . ^ 
The f a t h e r of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of India r e a l i s i n g 
t h a t t h e supremacy of law i s t h e on ly s e c u r i t y f o r the main-
t e n a n c e of j u s t i c e between man and man, and t h e only secur i ty 
f o r d i s c i p l i n e d and o d e r l y growth of democracy assigned to 
t h e Supreme Cour t , a p i v o t a l r o l e . The Supreme Court was 
i n a u g u r a t e d on J a n . 28 , 1950. 
( 1 ) B.R. Agarwal, Supreme Cour t P r a c t i c e and Procedure 4 
(Vth Ed. 1989) . 
IV 
The Supreme Court of India has the Original , 
Appel la te and Advisory j u r i s d i c t i o n s . The o r ig ina l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i s used r a r e ly , though these are few cases 
where the o r ig ina l j u r i s d i c t i o n has been invoked and 
exe rc i sed . 
The primary task of the Supreme Court i s 
a p p e l l a t e . In t h a t capacity i t serves as f inal a r b i t e r 
i n the construct ion of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l previsions 
and i t provides unifonn i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of law. I t has 
complete power to do so. I t a l so enables to change i t s 
mind from case to case . However i t attempts to adhere 
precedent known as s t a r e d e c i s i s . 
As the times changed, i n the i n t e r e s t of econo-
mic and soc ia l j u s t i c e the l e g i s l a t u r e had to place 
l i m i t a t i o n s on the freedom of cont rac t so tha- the party 
having g rea te r bargaining power could not misuse t h a t 
p o s i t i o n and gain an unfa i r advantage a t the cost of other 
p a r t y . The concept of welfare s t a t e made the s t a t e in 
India to pass the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Tne Present 
Act came into force on July ^^^, 1930. Un t i l t ha t date 
t h e law re l a t ing to sa le of goods was contained in 
Chapter VII (Section 76 to 123) of the Indian Contract Act, 
1872. Since 1872, when the Indian Contract Act was passed. 
V 
Conditions relating to commerce and business had gone 
numerous change. There had been various judicial 
decisions also which made the existing law out of date. 
The need for a change was, therefore, felt. To give 
effect to the changed situations the (..) Sale of Goods 
Act, 1930 (3 of 1930) was passed. 
The scheme followed in codifying the law for 
India has been thus explained by the special committee : 
In adopting the provisions of the English Act we have 
not been unmindful of the needs and exigencies of this 
country. Whether it has been found that a rule obtaining 
in England, such as that relating to market overt, is not 
suitable to Indian conditions, the rule has been rejected. 
We have moreover carefully scrutinized the provisions of 
English Court since 1839, and where their decisions have 
shown the provisions of the English Act to be defective 
and ambiguous, we have attempted to improve upon them. 
We have also retained several of the provisions of the 
Indian Contract Act which we consider necessary or useful 
to meet special conditions existing in India.^ 
(2) In India the word "Indian" has been ommitted by the 
Indian Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act, 1963 (Act 33 
of 1963), S.2. 
(3) Report of the Special Committee, Para-12 (Appendix,C). 
Yi 
It is well known that our Sale of Goods Act, 
1930 is based upon and largely a reproduction of.the 
English Act (English Sale of Goods Act, 1893) and in 
principle as well as in most details the law of sale 
of goods in both the countries is now the same and, 
therefore, English authorities on interpretation of 
different sections although not technically binding in 
India, whould have great persuasive value. 
Unlike much of the law of contract, sale of goods 
has been codified, that is put in statutory foim, by the 
Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Consequently, when the law of 
sale is examined, the tendency is to follow the lines set-
out in the Act. In the words of Lord Herschell.^ 
"the proper course is, in first instance, to 
examine the language of the statute and to 
ask what is its meaning." 
In State of Punjab V. Ajaib Singh^, Das J. held : 
"if the language of the Article is plain and 
unambiguous and admits of only one meaning then 
(4) V.D. Tulzapurkar in Consolidated Coffee Ltd. V. Coffee 
Board, Bangalore. A.I.R. 1980, S.C.1468 at 1490. 
(5) Bank of Ingland V. Vagliano Bros., (1891) A.C. 107 at 114. 
(6) A.I.R. 1953, S.C. 10. 
w 
the duty of court is to adopt that meaning 
irrespective of the convenience that such a 
. construction may produce : If, however, two 
constructions are possible, then the court 
may adopt that which will ensure smooth and 
harmonious working of the constitution and 
eschew the other which will lead to absurdity 
or give rise to practical in convenience or 
make well estabilished provisions of existing 
law nugatory.""7 
In Nalinakhya Bysack V. Shyam Sunder^ held : 
"It is not competent to proceed on the assum-
ption that the legislative has made a mistake. 
Even if there is some defect in the phraseology, 
the court can not aid the defective phrasing, 
or add, or amend, or by construction make up 
defeciencies, which are left in the Act." 
The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 : 
According to preamble the aim of the Act is "to 
define and amend the law relating to the sale of goods." 
The Act, therefore, does not profes-s to be a complete 
(7) Id. at 14. 
(8) A.I.R. 1953, S.C. 148. 
w 
code relating to law of sale of goods. It provides rules 
concerning general principles of the law of sale of goods 
and only some of the specific performances. In this Act 
definition of goods covers only the movable property there 
is no provision of sale of immovable property. Transfer 
of Property Act, 1886 covers that particular field. 
The Law Commissions of India in its 8^^ Report 
(1958) on the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 expressed the need 
for a seperate enactment to regulate hire-purchase transao-
9 
tions. The Law Commission on considered this aspect 
further in its 20''^ ^ Report (1961) on the Law of Hire - pur-
chase, Hire Purchase Act,1972 has been passed in accordance 
with the recommendation of the Law Commission. 
The purpose of the study to know the judicial 
trend of the Supreme Court on the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
The jSupreme Court expressed the view that although theorti-
cally it may be possible for the courts to evolve new heads 
(of public policy) under exceptional circumstances of the 
changing world, it is advisable in the interest of stability 
of society not to make any attempt to discover new heads in 
these days.' Second object of the study is to interprate 
the language of the code. 
(9) Law Commission of India. 4 (8'th Report, 1958) 
(10) Gheiulal Parekh V. Mahadeodas A.I.R. 1959 S.C.781 at 
795, per Subba Rao.J. 
IX 
For the sake of convenience the whole of the 
present work is classified into following Chapters : 
The first Chapter contains the definitions of 
particular terms, used in the Sale of Goods Act which 
are explained by the Supreme Court. 
In the second Chapter there is a provision 
about essentials of a sale* This Chapter covers the 
essential requisities of a sale and statutory compulsion 
on sale. 
The third Chapter deals with the distinction of 
sale with other transactions, such as agreement to sell, 
Exchange or barter. Hire Purchase, contract of work and 
labour and contract of Agency. This distinction is made 
for the provisions of sales taxes, because on sale there 
are provisions for sales tax and other transactions which 
are similar to contract of sale, there is no tax on these 
transactions. 
The fourth Chapter covers, 'the transfer of pro-
perty and risk'in goods. In reconsidering the law relating 
to the sale of good, two rnain aspects will be emphasised: 
the property aspect of sale of goods is to transfer of 
property from the seller to the buyer. The second aspect 
is contractual aspect, because sale is basically a contra-
ctual axxangement bet-ween t^ NO parties vihexeby t.he seller 
X 
agrees t o supply the buyer with the goods as described 
i n the con t rac t . 
The f i f t h Chapter contains ' t h e performance of 
t h e c o n t r a c t ' . Performance of the contract involves a 
de l ive iy of the goods by the s e l l e r and t h e i r acceptance, 
p lus payment of p r i c e , by the buyer. 
The s ix th Chapter deals with the ' the remedies 
for breach of contract of s a l e ' . I t deals with the basis 
of the remedies ava i lab le (usual ly t o the buyer) under 
the con t rac t . 
The seventh Chapter dea l s 
***** 
*** 
* 
C H A P T E R - ^ 
DEFINITIONS : 
CiD DOCUMENT OF TITLE TO GOODS : 
'Document of t i t l e t o g o o d s ' i n c l u d e s a b i l l of 
l a d i n g , dock-war ran t , ware h o u s e k e e p e r ' s c e r t i f i c a t e , 
w h a r f i n g e r s ' c e r t i f i c a t e , r a i l w a y r e c e i p t , warrant o r o the r 
f o r t h e d e l i v e r y of goods and any o t h e r document used in 
t h e ord ina l - / course of b u s i n e s s as proof of the posses s ion 
o r c o n t r o l of goods , o r a u t h o r i s i n g o r purpor t ing t o autho-
r i s e , e i t h e r by endorsement o r by d e l i v e r y , the posses so r 
of t h e document t o t r a n s f e r o r r e c e i v e goods thereby 
r e p r e s e n t e d . 
The exp re s s ion document of t i t l e t o goods i s used 
i n two s e n s e s : a narrow common s e n s e , and a much broader 
s t a t u t o r y s e n s e . There i s no a u t h o r i l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of 
'document of t i t l e t o goods ' a t common law, but i t means 
a document r e l a t i n g t o goods t h e t r a n s f e r of virvich opera tes 
a s a t r a n s f e r of t he c o n s t r u c t i v e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e goods, 
and may o p e r a t e as a t r a n s f e r of t h e p r o p e r t y in them. 
A d e l i v e r y o r d e r i n t h e absence of proof of custom 
(1) Sec . 2 (4) of t he Sale of Goods Act , 1930. 
to the contrary is not a document of title to goods at 
common law. 
In Bayyanan Bhimayya V. Government of Andhra 
Pradesh^ the Supreme Court took the view that a deliver/ 
order is a document of title to goods, and that the 
possessor thereof has the right to transfer it to another 
by endorsement or delivery. But, this unqualified propo-
sition, later, came to be analysed, explained and modified 
in Juggilal Kamlapat V. Pratapmal Rameshwar,"^ where the 
dealings had shown that the seller party had tendered, to 
the buyer party, pucca delivery orders on Mills, general 
described as European Mills passed, through several hands 
before they came into possession of the buyer party. These 
delivery orders contained a stipulation that the mills were 
not bound to recognise any transferee except the original 
buyer, and required the transferees to give an under taking 
to the mills that they would take delivery of the goods in 
terms of the contract between the Mill and original buyer. 
The dispute arose when certain pucca delivery orders were 
not accepted and no payment towards them was made the 
question before the Supreme Court was whether such pucca 
delivery oixiers amounted to documents of title to goods. 
(2) A.I.R. 1961, S.C. 1065. 
(3) A.I.R. 1978, S.C. 389. 
Having examined a number of authorities the Supreme Court 
was not able to find any case having laid down that a 
pucca delivery order, hedged round with conditions that 
the supplier of goods had reserved the option to deliver 
or not to deliver unless further conditions were complied 
with, could possibly be a 'document of title' as contem-
plated in Sec.2(4). It was held that such pucca delivery 
order could not authorise or purport to authorise the 
holder of document to transfer the goods mentioned in it 
until another agreement took place. Such pucca delivery 
orders were, therefore, not document of title. 
BILL OF LADIN3 - the term bill of lading has not been 
defined by the Bills of Lading Act, 1856. It was observed 
by the Supreme Court in J.V. Gokal & Co. (Pvt.) V. Assistant 
Collector, Sales Tax,"^  A bill of lading is 'a writing, 
signed on behalf of the owner of the ship in which goods 
are embarked, acknowledging the receipt of the goods, and 
under taking to deliver them at the end of the voyage, 
subject to such conditions as may be mentioned in the bill 
of lading". It is well settled in commercial world that 
a bill of lading represents the goods and the transfer of 
it operates as a transfer of the goods. 
(4) A.I.R. 1960, S.C. 595. 
RAILWAY RECEIPT -
A railway receipt is a docunent somewhat similar 
to a bill of lading. In The Union of India V. The West 
Punjab Factories^ held : that a railway receipt is a 
document of title to goods covered by it, but from that 
alone it does not follow, where the consignor and consignee 
are different. 
In brief, the document of title is a docunent which 
is regarded in the ordinary course of trade and conraierce as 
an evidence of the possession of control of goods represen-
ted by it or which authorities the possessor of such a 
document, by endorsement or delivery, to transfer or receive 
goods represented by it". Few example of such documents 
are : bill of lading, dock warrant, ware house-keeper's 
certificate, wharfinger's certificate, railway receipt, 
warrant, as order for delivery of goods. Any other document 
which has the above characterstics also will fall under the 
same category. 
(5) A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 395. 
(II) GOODS ; 
Section 2 (7) of the Sale of Goods Act, provides 
"goods" means every kind of moveable property other than 
actionable claims and money, and includes stock and shares, 
growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming 
part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale 
or under the contract of sale. 
The above mentioned definition of goods is wider 
than that contained in the English Act, for it includes 
such things as stocks and shares, which in English Law are 
not goods. The definition also makes it plain that things 
fixed to the land may be subject matter for a contract of 
sale of goods, provided that by the terms of contract it 
is clear that they are to be severed from the land, e.g. 
trees to be severed. 
According to Benjamin', the doubt as to whether 
a sale of emblements before severances is a sale of goods, 
has been dispelled by Section 62 (1 ) of the English Act, 
(6) Badri Prasad V. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 706 
the Supreme Court said, "It is true that trees which 
are agreed to be severed before sale or under the 
contract of sale are 'goods' for the purpose of the 
Sale of Goods Act". 
(7) Benjamin on Sale, 181-182 (8^^ Ed.). 
which declares them t o be ' goods ' . By the same sect ion 
" i n d u s t r i a l growing crops" are declared to be goods, and 
as regards th ings "attached to or forming part of the 
land" t h i s sec t ion spec i f i ca l l y dec la res tha t those which 
a r e agreed to be severed before sa l e or under the contract 
of s a l e , are ' goods ' . The d i s t i n c t i o n a t common law 
pointed out above are not of any importance under the 
d e f i n i t i o n of "goods" under the Sale of Goods Act. Now 
under a contract of sa le things a t tached to or forming 
p a r t of the land, whether the property i s to pass to the 
buyer before or a f t e r severance, are to be deemed "goods". 
The enactment has removed a l l doubt with regard to f ix tures , 
and has ce r t a in ly a l t e r ed the law with regard to buildings 
sold as ma te r i a l s , and with regard to fructus na tura les . 
If the p a r t i e s agree tha t such th ings s h a l l be severed they 
thereby become "goods". 
In S ta t e of Maharashtra V. Champalal Kishanlal 
Mohta°, the Supreme court held t h a t standing timber may 
o r d i n a r i l y not be regarded as "goods" but by inclusive 
d e f i n i t i o n given in Sec. 2 (7) of the Sale of Goods Act 
th ings which are at tached to the land may be the subject 
mat te r of contract of sa le provided t h a t under the terms 
(8 ) (1971) 1 S.C.R. 46 . 
of the contract they are to be severed before sale or 
under the contract of sale. In the present case it was 
Q 
expressly provided that the timber agreed to be sold 
shall be severed under the contract of sale. The timber 
was therefore "goods" within the meaning of Sec 2 (7) 
of the Sale of Goods Act.^ 
The things attached to the earth or embedded in 
the earth become goods within the meaning of the Act, if 
they are agreed to be severed in pursuance ox the contract 
of sale. 
In Commissioner of Income-Tax V. Bhurangya Coal 
11 Co., the Supreme Court said sale of a colliery as going 
concern, the intention of parties is that fixtures should 
pass with land to buyer and therefore, there is no sale 
of fixtures as moveables and further said, fixtures could 
be need to be moveable only if they were intended to be 
severed and sold seperately. 
(9) Id. at 48. 
(10) "In t h i s case the contract of s a l e entered i n t o by 
the respondent expressly provided tha t the timber 
agreed to be sold s h a l l be severed. High Court 
held tha t the sa le of s tanding t imber was not a 
sale of goods chargeable to s a l e s t a x " . 
(11) A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 254. 
e 
O 
The Supreme Court in H» Anraj V« Government of 
12 TamilnadUy made a pronouncement that the sale of a 
lottery ticket would be a transfer of benefecial interest 
and therefore, amounts to transfer of 'goods' and to 
that extent it is no transfer of actionable claims. 
13 
Law commission of India recommended that the 
definition of goods in clause (7) of Section 2 should in-
clude electricity, gas and water. 
The Supreme Court while considering the definit-
ion of goods in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M»P. V» M»P. 
Electricity Board^^ found that definition of goods in 
M.P. General Sales Tax Act (2 of 1959) includes all kinds 
of moveable property. The court observed: electric 
energy is not tangible or can not be moved or touched 
like, for instance, a piece of wood or a book it can not 
cease to be moveable property when it has all the attri-
butes of such property. It is needless to repeat that it 
is capable of abstraction, consumption and use...: It can 
be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed 
etc. in the same way as any other moveable property. 
So the legislature should be made an amendment in 
(12) A.I.R. 1986, S.C. 63. 
(13) (8^h Report, 1958) at 2. 
(14) A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 732. 
s 
Section 2(7) so as to include power in the shape of 
electrical energy, water and gas within the definition 
of "goods". 
(Ill) PRICE : 
Price means the money consideration for a sale of 
goods. The definition of price is taken from Section 1 
of the English Act. "Price", according to this defini-
tion, must be money, paid or promised, according as the 
agreement may be for a cash or a credit sale? but if any 
other consideration than money be given, it is not a sale. 
In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. V. Commissioner of 
Sales Tax, Bihar,'^ _^ „_ligIdLi It is manifest that under the 
Sale of Goods Act a transaction is called sale only where 
for money consideration property in goods is transferred 
under a contract of sale. In the instant case a sugar 
factory in Bihar Province in compliance with the directions 
issued by the sugar controller of India in exercise of 
authority under sugar & sugar products control order, 1946, 
despatched sugar to Madras Province. It was held that it 
was no sale by the assessee to the Madras Province and the 
transaction could not be taxed under the Bihar Sales Tax 
Act.17 
(15) Sec. 2(10) of Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
(16) A.I.R. 1963, S.C. 1207. 
(17) Id. at 1211. 
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In The Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh 
V. M/S Motor and Gaaeral Stores (P. ) Ltd.,"*^  the Supreme 
Court observed. there is no definition of the word 
price in the Transfer of Property Act. But, it is well 
settled that the word "Price" is used in the same sense 
in Sec. 54 of that Act as in Sec. 4 of the Sale of Goods 
Act, 1930. Sec. 2(10) of the Sale of Goods Act, defines 
"Price" as meaning the money consideration for a sale of 
goods. The presence of money consideration is therefore 
an essential element in a transaction of sale. If the 
consideration is not money but some other valuable consi-
deration it may be an exchange or barter but not a sale-. 
"The difference between a sale and an exchange is this, 
that in the former the price is paid in money, whilst in 
the latter it is paid in goods by way of barter".^*^ 
In Gopal Krishna Pillai V. K.M» Mani,^ '' the Supreme 
Court said that a re-sale of goods is also a sale and the 
money consideration in respect of such re-sale, whether to 
a third person or even to the original seller would be the 
price of goods re-sold, and such price is recoverable debt, 
provided the same is excluded from any law providing for 
debt relief. 
(18) A . I . R . 1968, S.C. 200. 
(19) Id . a t 202. 
(20) Ch i t t y on c o n t r a c t . 582 (22nd E ^ . . Vol . I I ) . 
(21) A . I . R . 1984, S.C. 216. 
Ascertainment of Price : 
Section 9 deals with ascertainment of price • 
(1) The Price in a contract of sale may be fixed by the 
contract or may be left to be fixed in manner there-
by agreed or may be determined by the course of 
dealing between the parties. 
(2) Where the price is not determined in accordance with 
the foregoing provisions, the buyer shall pay the 
seller a reasonable price- vVhat is a reasonable 
price is a question of fact dependent on t.ie circum-
stances of each particular case. 
In Carl Still G.m.b.H & Another V. The S-.ate of 
Bihar, ^ there was a contract for installation of coke-
battery and by-products plant for all inclusive price. 
It was held by majorityi^^ It is clear from the clauses 
that the subject matter of the agreement was the installa-
tion of the coke-over battery and its accessories, that 
the sum of Rs. 2,31,50,000/- was the price agreec to be 
paid for the execution of those works and that "here was 
no agreement for the sale of materials, as such, by the 
(22) A.I.R. 1916, S,C. 1615. 
(23) Id. at 1619. 
u 
a p p e l l a n t s t o the owner. In other words, the agreement 
i n quest ion i s a con t tac t en t i r e and i n d i v i s i b l e for the 
cons t ruc t ion of specif ied works for a lump sum and not 
con t rac t of sale of mater ia ls as such and fu r the r held 
t h a t as the contract in question did not embody an agree-
ment for the sa le of mater ia ls as such, there v/as no 
cont rac t of sa le with respect to them and Sec. 9 of the 
Sale of Goods Act which presupposes the existence of a 
cont rac t of sa le of goods could have no app l ica t ion for 
t he purpose of f ix ing the pr ice of the mater ia ls by r e -
course t o the account books of the appel lant or the 
course of deal ings between the p a r t i e s . 2 4 
In Kurapatl Venkata Mallayya V. Thondepu Rama 
25 Swami & Co«, the Supreme Court held tha t i t i s not 
an invar iab le ru le tha t where a contract for sa le has 
taken place a p r i ce must necessar i ly have been agreed 
upon. By enacting Sub Sec.(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 
t he l e g i s l a t u r e has i t self accepted the exis tence of 
con t rac t s wherein p r i ce i s not fixed as not an unusual 
phenomenon. 
(24) Supra note 22. 
(25) A.I.R. 1964, S.C. 818. 
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(IV) SPECIFIC GOODS : 
•Specific goods' mean goods identified and agreed 
upon at the time a contract of sale is made. This defi-
nition is same as in English Act. The term 'specific goods' 
is not identical with 'ascertained goods'. It does not 
certainly mean goods v;hich have been examined by the buyer. 
Specific goods must be actually identified, it is not 
sufficient that they are capable of identification. 
In A»V» Thomas and Co. Ltd. V. Deputy Commissioner 
Of Agricultural Income Tax and Sales Tax, Trivendram,^^ 
there was an auction sale of full lots of tea by sample 
and this event took place at fort Cochin which was in the 
State of Madras. It was held the goods were specific 
goods which are auctioned in full lots by sample. 
If the goods are unascertained than it is well 
setteled that a contract for unascertained goods is not a 
complete sale, but only a promise to sell. ° 
In Consolidated Coffee Ltd. V. Coffee Board, 
Bangalore,^^ the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision 
(26) Sec. 2(14) of Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
(27) A. I.R. 1964, S.C 569. 
(28) R.N. Mahato V. State of M.P.1970(l) S.C.C.25 at 30. 
(29) A.I.R. 1980, S.C. 1468. 
in A»V» Thomas V» Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural 
Income Tax. 
In brief the necessary ingredients of specific 
goods are as follows :-
(1) They must be in existence at the time of^the 
contract of sale is made; 
(2) They must be appropriated towards the ccntract 
of sale, and 
(3) They must be identified and agreed upon at the 
time when the contract of sale is made. It is 
not sufficient that they are capable of identi-
fication at the time of contract of sale is 
made. 
***** 
*** 
* 
(30) Supra note - 27. 
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C H A P T E R - I I 
C3DNCEPT OF SALE ; 
(A) CONTRACT OF SALE :-
The provisions of Sale of Goods Act, 1930 are 
based mainly on the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893. 
The essence of sale is the transfer of the property in 
a thing from one person to another for a price. ' 
The expression 'sale' is sometimes used purely 
in the sense of the transaction which concerns the transfer 
of property, divorced from all contractnal considerations. 
Benjamin writing before the Act of 1893, defined a sale 
as, "a transfer of the absolute or general property in a 
thing for a price in money.^ " 
In corpus Juris^, the law is thus stated : sale 
in legal nomenclature, is a term of precise legal import, 
both at law and in equity, and has a well defined, "legal 
signification, and has been said to mean, at all times, 
a contract between parties to give and pass rights of 
property for money, which the buyer pays or promise to pay 
to the seller for the thing bought or sold. 
(1) Chalmer's Sale of Goods Act, 3, 02'^^Eci.) 
(2) Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 26, (2"^ Ed.) 
(3) Vol. 55 at 36. 
Sa le^ i s the t r ans f e r of the ownership of a 
t h ing from one person to another for a money p r i c e . 
Where the cons idera t ion for the t r a n s f e r consis ts of 
o t h e r goods or some other valuable considerat ion, not 
being money the t r ansac t ion i s cal led exchange or 
b a r t e r , but in ce r t a in circumstances i t may be treated 
as one of s a l e . 
Wi l l i s ton on Sale , " sa le of goods" i s defined 
as "an agreement whereby the s e l l e r t r ans fe r the property 
i n goods to the buyer for a considera t ion cal led the 
p r i c e . The learned author observes tha t^ , " I t has doubt-
l e s s been genera l ly said tha t the p r ice must be payable 
i n mo ney." 
In the concise Oxford Dictionary'^, "sa le" i s 
defined as exchange of a commodity for money or other 
valuable cons idera t ion s e l l i n g . 
The concept of sale i s based upon the philosophy 
of ' l a s sez f a i r e ' which was the dominent feature of the 
law of contrac t in 19^^ century. 
(4) Helsbury's Law of England, 5, (II""^ Ed.V.29). 
(5) Wil l is ton on Sale , 2 (1948, Ed.) 
(6) Id. a t 443. 
(7) Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
1 
Section 4 of the sale of Goods Act 1930 runs 
as follows : 
(1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract 
where^by the seller transfers or agrees to 
transfer the property in goods to the buyer 
for a price. There may be a contract of 
sale between one part owner and another. 
(2) A contract of sale may be absolute or 
conditional. 
(3 ) Where under a contract of sale the property 
in the goods is transferred from the seller 
to the buyer, the contract is called a sale 
but where the transfer of the property in 
the goods is to take place at a future time 
or subject to some condition thereafter to 
be fulfilled, the contract is called an 
agreement to sell. 
(4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale where 
the time elapses or the condition are ful-
filled subject to which the property in 
the goods is to be transferred. 
IS 
(B) ESSEOTIAL REQUISITES OF SALE : 
Con t r ac t of s a l e i s a c o n t r a c t between a s e l l e r 
and b u y e r . The s e l l e r means a pe r son who s e l l s or agrees 
t o s e l l goods and t h e buyer means a p e r s o n who buys o r 
a g r e e s t o buy goods^ . According t o S e c . 4 ( l ) t h e r e may 
be a c o n t r a c t of s a l e between one p a r t o'/mer and ano the r . 
I t should be observed t h a t , though t h e Act contemplates 
two d i s t i n c t p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n t r a c t , v i z a buyer and 
s e l l e r , i t does not fol low t h a t t h e buye r can not be t h e 
owner of t h e goods 1^. 
The word ' s a l e ' p r o p e r l y connotes t h e t r a n s f e r 
of t h e a b s o l u t e or g e n e r a l p r o p e r t y i n a t h i n g for a p r i c e 
i n money. 
The Supreme Couirt has he ld t h a t according t o t h e 
law, bo th of England and of I n d i a , i n o r d e r t o c o n s t i t u t e 
a s a l e , i t^^necessary t h a t t h e r e should be an agreement 
be tween t h e p a r t i e s f o r t h e purpose of t r a n s f e r r i n g t i t l e s 
t o goods , which o fcourse presupposed c a p a c i t y to c o n t r a c t , 
t h a t i t must be supported by money c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h a t as a 
r e s u l t of t r a n s a c t i o n . The p r o p e r t y must a c t u a l l y pass i n 
t h e goods . 
(8) S . 2 (13) of t h e Sale of Goods Ac t , 1930. 
( 9 ) S . 2 ( 1 ) . of t h e Sale of Goods Act , 1930. 
(10) P . S . At iyah , The Sale of Goods, 14 (11"^ Ed.) 
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In The State of Bombay V. United Motors Ltd* , 
Bose J-^  said : 
' The difficulty is apparent when one begins to 
split a sale into its component parts and analyse 
them when this is done, a sale is found to consist 
of number of ingredients which can be said to be 
essential in the sense that if any one of them is 
missing there is no sale. The following are some 
of them : 
(1) The existence of goods which form the 
subject matter of the sale-
(2) The bargain or contract which when executed, 
will result in the passing of the property 
in the goods for a price. 
(3) The payment, or promise of payment, of a 
price. 
(4) The passing of the title.^^ 
The similar view was expressed in Poppatlal Shah 
Partner of M/S Indo Malayan Trading Co. V. The 
State of Madras 13. 
(iW A.I.R. 1953, S.C. 252. 
(12) Id. at 264. 
(13) A.I.R. 1953, S.C. 274. 
2a 
Wherein it was said that the expression "sale 
of goods" is a composite expression consisting of various 
ingredients or elements thus, there are the elements of 
a bargain or contract of sale, the payment or promise of 
payment of price the delivery of goods and the actual 
passing of title & each one of them is essential to a 
transaction of sale though the sale is not completed or 
concluded unless the purchaser becomes the owner of 
property. 
The State of Madras V« M/S Gannon Dunkerley & 
Co. Madras V the facts of the instant case were as 
follows. The respondents a,pe--a-private limited com.pany, 
doing business in the construction of buildings, roads 
and others works and in the sale of sanitary wares and 
other sundry goods. Before the sales tax authorities the 
disputes ranged over a number of items, one was with the 
value of the material used by the respondents and other 
relates to the price of food grains supplied by the 
respondents to their workmen. 
S.2 (h) of The Madras General Sales Tax Act (Mad. IX of 
1939), defined -
"Sale" as meaning, "every transfer of the property 
(14) A.I.R. 1958, S.C. 560. 
i n goods by one person to another i n the course of t rade 
o r business for cash or deferred payment or other valuable 
cons idera t ion" . In 1947, the l e g i s l a t u r e of Madras General 
Sa les Tax (Amendment) Act No. XXV of 1947 introducing 
seve ra l new provis ions in the Act. The de f in i t i on of sa le 
i n S.2(h) was enlarged so as to include "a t r ans fe r of 
property in goods involved in the execut ion of a works 
con t r ac t " . 
The so le question for determinat ion in this 
appeal was whether the provisions of the Madras General 
Sa les Tax Act were u l t r av i r e s in so f a r as they seek to 
impose a tax on the supply of ma te r i a l s i n execution of 
works contrac t t r e a t i n g i t as a s a l e of goods by the contra-
c t o r and answer t o i t must depend on the meaning to be given 
t o the words " sa l e of goods" in Entry 48 in l i s t I I of 
Sch. VII to the Government of India Act 1935. 
In t h i s case the opinion of learned judges was 
tha t^^" the re i s no sale as such of ma te r i a l used in a 
bui lding con t rac t , and that the Prov inc ia l Legislatures 
had no competence to impose a tax thereon under Entr/ 48" . 
The Judgment , of The S t a t e of Madras V.M/S Gannon 
Dunkerley & Co. Madras "^ ^ was followed in:: ( l ) Pandit 
(15) Id. a t 578. 
(16) Supra note - 14. 
6.M 
Banarsi Das Bhanot (2) Jabalpur Contractors Association 
and Others (3) Madhya Pradesh Contractors Association & 
Others V. (1) The State of Madhya Pradesh & Others 
(2) The Sales Tax Officers Nagpur and Others P it was 
held that, when a question arises as to whether a 
particular works contract could be charged to sales-tax, 
it will be for the authorities under the Act to determine 
whether the agreement in question is, on its true cons-
truction, a combination of an agreement to sell and an 
agreement to work, and it they come to the conclusion 
that such is its character, then it will be open to them 
to proceed against that part of it which is a contract 
for the sale of goods, and impose tax thereon.^^ 
The mere transfer of goods by the owner from one 
place to another can not amount to sale, it was held in. 
The Sales Tax Officer Navagaon and another V« Timber and 
Fuel Corp. Orchha Distt. Tikamgarh^^. In the instant 
case a registered dealer under the M.P. Sales Tax statute, 
purchased large quantities of timber from the Forest Depart-
ment of the Madhya Pradesh Govt, and transported a part of 
(17) A.I.R. 1958, S.C 909. 
(18) Id. at 912. 
(19) A.I.R. 1937, S.C. 2350. 
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it to Uttar Pradesh, where he had a storing place. The 
sales tax officer raised a preposterous contention that 
the transfer of timber by the dealer from M.P. to U.P. 
amounted to sale under the M.P. salex tax statute. The 
Supreme Court rejected it and observed that it was mere 
transfer of goods and not amount to sale. In the words 
of the Suprem.e Court : 
"As the High Court very rightly held that a 
mere transfer of goods by the owner from one 
place to another place can not amount to 
sale".20 
In consice, We can say the essential elements of sale must 
Co-exist so as to constitute a sale of goods : 
(i) The parties to a contract must be competent to enter 
into it. 
(ii) They must give their mutual, free consent. 
(iii) A thing general propert-^_JjLJvhlch_is transferred from 
seller to the buyer should exist, 
(iv) A price in money (not in kind) should be paid or 
promised, 
(v) A transfer of property in goods from seller to buyer 
must take place. 
(20) Id. at 2351. 
It 
(C) STATUTORY COMPULSION : 
Now t h e q u e s t i o n i s i f t h e r e i s a supply of 
g o o d s , by a s u p p l i e r under s t a t u t o r y compulsion then 
t h e r e w i l l a c o n t r a c t of s a l e o r n o t . This q u e s t i o n 
came f i r s t t ime before t h e Supreme Court i n New India 
S u g a r M i l l s Ltd« V. Commissioner of S a l e s Tax B i h a r ^ 
New India Sugar Mi l l s Ltd. h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d ' a s s e s s e e s ' 
own a f a c t o r y i n Bihar , i n compliance wi th d i r e c t i o n s 
i s s u e d by sugar c o n t r o l l e r of I nd i a i n e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y 
under suga r and suga r produc ts c o n t r o l o rde r s 1946 despa tch-
i n g sugar t o Madras p rov ince . In assessment proceedings 
t h e a s s e s s e e s sought t o escape from t h e l i a b i l i t y of s a l e s 
t a x on t h e ground t h a t t h e r e was no c o n t r a c t of s a l e but a 
compliance with d i r e c t i o n i s sued by s u g a r c o n t r o l l e r . 
The Major i ty of t h e Supreme Court observec 
t h r o u g h Shah J . J 
I t i s t h e common ground t h a t t h e p rov ince of 
Madras i n t i m a t e d i t s r equ i r emen t of s u g a r to 
t h e c o n t r o l l e r , and t h e c o n t r o l l e r c a l l e d upon 
t h e manufacturing u n i t s t o supply s u g a r . In 
c a l l i n g upon the manufac tur ing u n i t s t o supply 
sugar , t h e c o n t r o l l e r d id not a c t as an agsnt 
(21) A . I .R . 1963, S.C. 1207. 
ido 
of the state to purchase goods, he acted in 
exercise of his statutory authority. There 
was manifestly no offer to purchase sugar by 
the province, and no acceptance of any offer 
22 
by the manufacturer. 
The court fur ther held t h a t a contract of sale 
between the s e l l e r and the buyer i s the re fore , a prerequis i te 
t o a s a l e and since there was no such contrac t , the 
t r a n s a c t i o n in quest ion which the Bihar Sales Tax Authorit ies 
sought to tax was not exigible to sa les t a x . 
A d issen t ing judgment was delivered by Hidaytullah 
J . He observed tha t due to short supply or maldis t r ibut ion 
of goods, controls have to be imposed. There are permits, 
p r i c e control ra t ion ing and shops which are l icensed. He 
quoted the case Tata Iron and S tee l Case, which was the 
case of con t ro l , in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case i t was not said 
t h e r e was no s a l e . The contract a t fixed pr ice both sides 
having or deemed to have agreed t o such p r i c e . Consent 
under the law of contract need not to be express, i t can be 
implied, so in these t ransac t ions the re was a sa le of sugar 
f o r p r ice and the tax was payable. Hidaytullah J . , in his 
d i s s e n t i n g opinion, however, observed t h a t in such a case 
t h e r e was implied contract of sa le between the p a r t i e s . 
(22) Id. a t 1212. 
(23) A.I.R. 1958, S.C. 452. 
(.. -• 
In his view, "a compelled sale is nevertheless a sale". 
This progressive approach of Hidaytullah J. 
followed by the Supreme Court in Indian Steel wire Products 
Ltd. V. State of Madras^"^ the appellant supplied iron 
and steel products to various persons in persuance of orders 
of controller exercising powers under Iron & Steel (Control 
of production And Distribution) Order 1941, it was held 
that from the record it could not be contended that the 
transaction were completely regulated and controlled by the 
controller leaving no room for mutual assent the transaction 
amo\inted to sale. 
The same concept was further followed in 
Andhra Sugar Ltd. V« State of A«P«,^^ the Supreme Court 
held that the compulsion of law by which a factory owner 
is required to make an acceptance of the sugar can offered 
to him at a fixed price does not make the contract void or 
voidable. Tne agreement so made is legally enforceable 
and is a contract of sale '/vithin the Sec.4 of the sale of 
Goods Act 1930. 
In State of Rajasthan and Another V» \f^Z Karam 
Chand Thappar and Brothers (Coal Sales) Ltd. Jaipur.26 the 
(24) A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 478. 
(25) A.I.R. 1968, S.C 599. 
(26) A.I.R. 1969, S.C. 343. 
\Lt 
State of Rajasthan and the assessee acting as an agent 
of a coal company to the state power house under are 
agreement between them, the price chargeable was fixed 
under the colliery control order 1945. It was held that 
there was in the present case an agreement of sale between 
the parties competent to contract and in persuance of the 
agreement of sale, property in the goods supplied passed 
to the purchaser for price agreed to be paid the transact-
ion was, therefore, one of sale of goods.^7 
The Supreme Court reviewed its earliar decisions, 
in Chhittermal Naraindas V. Commissioner of Sales Tax.^^ 
the Supreme Court found that particular quantities of 
wheat delivered by the assessee in compliance with the 
provision of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order 1959, 
were not sales, having regard to the compulsive nature of 
the deliveries made, there was no mutual assent and no 
contract of sale. 
But in Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. V« State of 
Mysore,^^ the Supreme .Court, makes it clear beyond all 
doubts that despite some measure of compulsion, a contract 
of sale of goods could yet be. consensual enough to attract 
sales tax. The assessee mills petitioned the Mysore High 
(27) Id. at 347. 
(28) A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 2000. 
(29) A.I.R. 1972, S.C 87. 
<i5 
Court for a wri t prohibi t ing the S ta te of Mysore from 
levying or co l l ec t ing any purchase tax under the Mysore 
Sa le Tax Act of 1957, as amended by Mysore Act of 1961, 
i n respect i t contended tha t t he re was no sa le or purchase 
of sugar cane i n t h i s case by reason of want of mutual 
consent as a l l i t s t r ansac t ions with the growers were 
entered into under s t a tu to ry requirements and there was 
no element of freedom to buy or s e l l a t any stage of those 
t r a n s a c t i o n . The High Court did not accept t h i s contention. 
The Supreme Court, affirming the High Court 
dec i s ion re jec ted the contention of mi l ls and d i s t i n g u i -
shing the fac ts from those of New India Sugar Mills Ltd. 
V. Commissioner of Sales Tax,30 i t held, i n a lengthy 
judgynent e labora te ly examining precedents, tha t despi te 
the compulsory, regulatojTjr provis ions of the control order, 
the t r ansac t ion between the mi l l s and the growers were 
consensual in na ture . ' 
Again in 1973, the Supreme Court followed i t s 
e a r l i e r dec is ion , of New India Sugar Mills Ltd. V. 
Commissioner of Sales Tax.^^ C h i t t a r Mai Naraian Das 
V. Commissioner of Sales Tax,U.P.^^ and Sa l a r Jung 
J^^jn*; T.td. V. Mysore.^"^ in S ta t e of Tamilnadu v. 
(30) Supranote - 2 1 . 
(31) Annual Survey of Indian Law, 44 (Vol. I l l , 1972) 
(32) Supra no te - 2 1 . 
(33) Supra note- 28. 
(34) Supra note- 29. 
c^ 
Thiruvalagal India Cement Ltd.35 j ^ e Supreme Court held 
t h a t t r ansac t ions whereby cement was supplied by the 
producer to the S ta te Trading Corporation in pursuance of 
the Cement Control Order, 1958, were not sales taxable 
under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. 
The dec i s ion in the i n s t a n t case r e -a s se r t s the 
New India Sugar Mills Case^^ p r i n c i p l e that a sa le i s a 
consensnal t r a n s a c t i o n . 
But in Oil And Natural Gas Commission V. Sta te of 
Bihar, the supreme court s t a t ed t h a t a sale may not 
r equ i re the consensnal element and t h a t there may, in t ru th , 
be a compulsory sa l e of property with which the owner is 
compelled to pa r t for a pr ice aga ins t his wil l and the 
e f f ec t of the s t a t u t e in such a case i s to say tha t the 
absence of the t r a n s f e r o r ' s consent does not matter and 
t h e sa le i s produced without i t . ^ ^ 
An important pronouncement by the Supreme Court 
which occured in Vishnu Agencies (Pvt . ) Ltd. V. Commercial 
Tax Officer and Others ,^^ which i s a seven bench decision. 
In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case a company ca l l ed , Vishnu Agencies 
(35) A. I.R. 1937, S.C. 668. 
(36) Supra note - 21. 
(37) A. I.R. 1976, S.C. 2478. 
(38) Id. at 2480. 
(39) A.I.R. 1978, S.C. 449. 
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( P v t . ) Ltd. , carr ied on business as an agent and d i s t r i -
butor of cement in the s t a t e of West Bengal. Dis t r ibut ion 
of Cement i s regulated by '.Vest Bengal Cement Control Act, 
26 of 1948. The sole question before the court was whether 
t h e supply and d i s t r i b u t i o n of cement, under the control 
o rde r issued by the Govt, of '.Vest Bengal was a contract of 
s a l e . The majority of court followed the d issent ing judg« 
ment of Hidaytullah J . in New India Sugar Mills,^"^ wherein 
t h e judge had said : 
"So long as the pa r t i e s t r ade under controls 
a t fixed pr ice and accept these as any other 
law of the realm because they must, the contract 
i s a t the fixed price both s ides having a deemed 
to have agreed to such p r i c e . " ^ 
The court a lso support t h i s reascning by mentioning 
t h a t the soc ia l philosophy of complete freedom of contract 
of the era of the lassez fa i re was given way to public 
con t ro l of con t rac t s , and that the freedom of contract has 
now la rge ly become an i l l u s i o n , necessitating a fundamental 
change in the j u d i c i a l out look. The court overruled the 
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major i ty judgment in New India Sugar Mills as no longer 
(40) Supra note - 21 . 
(41) Supra note - 21 a t 1226. 
(42) Supra note - 2 1 . 
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representing good law. 
Beg C.J. reached the same conclusion as the 
majority but for different reasons. He disagreed with 
the dissenting note of Hidaytullah J. Ke observed : 
V/hat could be implied, upon the facts of a 
particular case, must still be a consent to 
a proposal if the transaction is to be construed 
as a 'sale' mere compliance with an order may 
imply an acceptance of an order but acceptance 
of a proposal to purchase or sell is of a 
juristically different genus.^^ 
To escape from a different conclusion, Beg C.J. 
drew a distinction between a compulsory acquisition and 
a mere regulation order. The .former did not amount 
to a sale, whereas the latter, even if it circumscribed 
the area of free choice, did not take away the basic 
character or core of 'sale' from the transaction. 
According to A.S. Bhat,'^ the distinction, is 
erroneous both compulsory acquisition and a mere regu-
latory order impose limitations on the freedom of contract. 
A contract in the classical sense does not adm.it of any 
(43) Supra note 39 at 464. 
(44) A.S. Bhat, "Promise or Secur i ty? The Demise of 
Contract i n India". 275 (27, J . I . L . I . , 1985 ) at 278. 
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cond i t ions or l i m i t a t i o n s . I t i s a l so d i f f i c u l t to 
apprec ia t e the r a t i o of the judgment of Beg C.J. for 
h i s having, on the one hand, hes i t a t ed to hold the 
major i ty view in New India Sugar Mills as erroneous and, 
on the o ther for concurring with h i s other brethren who 
held the minority view of Hidaytullah J . as the t rue 
p o s i t i o n in law. The majority opinion in New India Sugar 
Mi l l s i s i rreconcilabJe with the majority opinion in 
Vishnu Agencies. Being conscious of the economic inequa-
l i t i e s and the recurrent c r i s i s produced the doctr ine of 
t h e freedom of cont rac t such a judgment by Beg C . j . i s 
u nwarranted.^^ 
A.S. Bhat, fur ther said t h a t majority in Vishnu 
Agencies reviewed the e n t i r e case law on the subject , 
t r aced the h i s to ry of freedom of contract from Adam Smith's 
Wealth of nations down to the present and observed : 
"Towards the close of the nineteenth century i t came to 
be r e a l i s e d tha t p r iva te en t e rp r i s e , in order to be 
s o c i a l l y j u s t , had to ensure economic equal i ty ."46 
(45) Beg C.J. c i ted the following passage from his ea r l i e r 
judgement in Commissioner Sales Tax V. Ram Bilas Ram 
Gopal. A.I .R. 1970 Al l . 518 a t 524. " I t i s toola te in 
the day, when so much of the na t ion ' s soc ia l & econo-
mic a c t i v i t i e s are guided and governed by control order 
a l lotment o rders , and s t a tu to ry con t rac t s , to contend 
t h a t mere s t a t e regulat ion of the economic sphere of 
l i f e r e s u l t s i n the destruction of the nature of the 
t r ansac t ions which take place within t h a t sphere". 
(46) Supra note - 39. 
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The supreme court followed i t s decis ion of 
Vishnu Agencies (Pvt . ) Ltd. V« Commercial Jax Officer."^^ 
i n Union Ter r i to ry of Chandigarh V« M/S Amrit Roller 
Flour M i l l s ' ^ and held tha t the t r an sac t i ons effected by 
t h e appel lant must be regarded as s a l e s . In the ins tant 
Case the respondent grinded the wheat, which was supplied 
under the orders of the Government of India and supplied 
the a t t a , maida and suj i emerging from tha t process to the 
holders of permits issued by the D i s t r i c t food and supplies 
o f f i c e r under the control order . During the assessment 
proceedings respondent contended t h a t the t ransact ions 
entered in to by i t did not c o n s t i t u t e s a l e . 
An i n t e r e s t i n g question was ra ised before the 
Supreme Court, i n Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore V. 
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Karnataka and Others,^^ 
as t o whether a f t e r voluntar i ly opt ing t o grow coffee in 
terms of scheme of Coffee Act, 1942 the requirement of 
g iving over the coffee to the coffee Board at pr ice deter-
mined as per scheme of the Act, cons t i t u t ed sa le as to 
a t t r a c t subject ion to purchase t a x . The Supreme Court 
observed : 
All the four e s sen t i a l elements of sale* 
( i ) P a r t i e s competent t o con t r ac t , ( i i ) Mutual 
(47) Supra note - 39. 
(48) A.I.R. 1985, S.C. 1199. 
(49) A.I.R. 1988, S.C. 1487. 
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consent though minimal, by growing coffee under the 
condition imposed by the Act, (iii) Transfer of 
property in the goods and (iv) payment of price 
though deffered,- are present in the transaction in 
question. Court therein approved the minority 
opinion of Hidaytullah J. in Mew India Sugar Mills Ltd. 
V. Commissioner of Sales Tax,^Q the nature of the 
transactions contemplated under the Act mutual assent 
either express or implied is not totally absent in 
this case in the transaction under the Act'.'. Further 
said, "the payment of price to growers is an important 
element to determine the consensnality in the sale. 
Thus, all the four essentials indicated for sale being 
present, the transaction has to be treated as sale 
under Sec. 4 (l) of the Sale of Goods Act."^^ 
(50) Supra note - 21. 
(51) Supra note 49 at 1498. 
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C H A P T E R - I I I 
SALE DISTINGUISHED WITH OTHER TRANSACTIONS : 
(I) HIRE RJRCHASE AND CONTRACT OF SALE :-
The nature of hire purchase agreement is expre-
ssed in Halsbury's Laws of England^ : 
The contract of hire-purchase is one of the 
variations of the contract of bailment, but it 
is a modern development of commercial life, and 
the rules with regard to bailments, which were 
laid down before any contract of hire purchase 
was contemplated, can not be applied simpliciter, 
because such a contract has in it not only the 
element of bailment, but also the element of sale. 
At common law the term 'hire purchase' properly 
applies only to contract of hire conferring an 
option to purchase, but it is often used to describe 
contracts which are in reality agreements to 
purchase chattels by instalments, subject to a 
condition that the property in them is not to pass 
until all instalments have been paid. The distin-
ction between these two types of hire purchase 
contracts is, however, a most important one, because 
(1) Halsbury's Laws of England, 510-511 (III Ed.V. 19). 
0'v« 
under the latter type of contract there is a 
binding obligation on the hirer to pass a good 
title to a purchaser or pledgee dealing with 
him in good faith and without notice of the 
rights of the true owner, whereas in the case of 
a contract which merely confers an option to 
purchase there is no binding obligation on the 
hirer to buy and a purchaser or pledgee can 
obtain no better title than the hirer had, except 
in the case of a sale in market overt, the contract 
not being an agreement to buy vrith in the Factors 
Act 1889, or the Sale of Goods Act 1B93. 
CONTRACT OF SALE DISTINGUISHED FROM HIRE PURCHASE 
AGREEMENTS :-
"Hire purchase agreements at common law, may be 
defined as a contract for the hiring of goods under which 
there is conferred on the hirer an ' option to buy the goods 
The silent features of such an agreement are : first, that 
during the currency of the agreement, the property in the 
goods remains in the owner, while the hirer is a mere bailee 
having no power to dispose of them; and, secondly, that 
the hirer has an option to buy the goods but not a binding 
3. 
o b l i g a t i o n to do so . In p r a c t i c e , h i r e purchase i s a 
device used in order to give possess ion and the use of 
goods to an intending buyer over a period during which 
he paysthe p r i c e , with i n t e r e s t , by instalments while 
t h e s e l l e r r e t a i n s the t i t l e to the goods as secur i ty 
o 
for the unpaid balance of the price. 
3 
According to the Hire - Purchase Act 1972, 
"hi re-purchase agreement" means an agreement under which 
goods are l e t on h i r e and under which the h i r e r has an 
opt ion to purchase them in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement and includes an agreement under which i 
( i ) possession of goods i s del ivered by the 
owner thereof t o a person on condition 
t h a t such person pays the agreed amount 
in per iod ica l i n s t a lmen t s , and 
( i i ) the property in the goods i s to pass to 
such person on the payment of the l a s t of 
such ins ta lments , and 
( i i i ) such person-has a r i g h t to terminate the 
agreement a t any time before the property 
so passes . 
The cont rac t of h i re purchase, or more accurately, 
t h e contract of h i r e with an opt ion of purchase, i s one under 
(2) Benjamins Sale of Goods, 52 (II Ed.) 1981. 
(3) (Act No. 26 of 1972) S .2 (c ) . 
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which an owner of goods lets them out on hire and under-
takes to sell them to, or that they shall become the 
property of the hirer, conditionally on his makir^ a 
certain number of payments. Until payment is made in 
full the property in the goods does not pass to the hirer. 
The difference between a contract of sale and 
a contract of hire purchase is that in the former the 
purchaser has no option of terminating the contract and 
returning the goods, whereas in the latter the hirer has. 
Second main difference in the former, there is an agreement 
to purchase, whereas in the latter there is none. 
The First time, the Supreme Court deteimine the 
test for distinguishing a contract of sale from an agree-
ment of hire-purchase in K«L» Johar & Co« V. The Deputy 
Commercial Tax Officer, Coimbatore III, the facts of 
instant case were that the appellant company, a financing 
firm, carried on the business of advancing money by entering 
into hire purchase agreements with those willing to buy 
motor vehicles. The appellant paid the price to the dealer 
and the car was handed over to the hirer. The hirer paid 
the price by monthly instalments. He had the option to 
determine the agreement at any time by paying rent up-t?>-
date and returning the vehicle. The Madras High Court held 
(4) A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 1082. 
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That the transaction amounted to an immediate sale. But 
the Supreme Court after following the English judg ments 
in Lee V. Butler^ and Helby V. Mathews^ held that 
the transaction would amounted to sale only when the option 
is exercised. 
Wanchoo, J. in the instant case clearly distingui-
shed between a sale and a hire - purchase agreement : 
"The essence of sale is that the property is 
transfered from the seller to the buyer for a 
price, whether paid at once or paid later in 
instalments. On the other hand, a hire purchase 
agreements as its very name implies, has two 
aspects. There is first an aspect of bailment 
of the goods subjected to the hire purchase 
agreement, and there is next an element cf sale 
which fructifies when the option to purchase, 
which is usually a term of hire purchase agreements, 
is exercised by the intending purchaser. Thus 
the intending purchaser is known as the hirer so 
long as the option to purchase is not exercised, 
and the essence of a hire purchase agreecent 
properly so called is that the property in the 
goods does not pass at the time of the agreement 
(5) (1893) 2 Q.B. 318. 
(6) (1895) A.C.- 471. 
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but remains in the in tending s e l l e r , and only 
passes l a t t e r when the opt ion i s exercised by 
the intending purchaser . The d is t inguishing 
feature of a t y p i c a l h i re-purchase agreement 
therefore , i s t h a t , the property does not pass 
when the agreement i s made but only passes when 
the option i s f i na l ly exercised a f t e r complying 
with a l l the terrr-.s of the agreement.""^ 
In Sundaram Finance Ltd. V. The S t a t e of Kerala and Another^ 
a p p e l l a n t , a company with t h e i r r eg i s t e r ed office in Madras, 
c a r r i e d on business of financing purchases of motor vehicles 
on the secur i ty of those veh i c l e s . The scheme for financing 
the purchase of the vehicle was t h a t the customer purchased 
the vehicle.from the dea le r d i r e c t l y and got i t regis tered 
i n h is name. At his request appe l lan t agreed to advance 
the balance of the p r i ce remaining t o be paid, and pay i t 
to the dea le r on the customer's executing a promissory note 
fo r repayment of the amount, a h i re-purchase agreement and 
o the r r e l a t ed documents. On repayment of the amount s t ipu-
l a t ed to be paid, the vehicle become the sole and absolute 
proper ly of the customer. The e x i g i b i l i t y to tax on the 
a l leged ' s a l e ' r e su l t i ng from payment of a l l instalments 
under the hire-purchase agreement was a t i s s u e . 
(7) Supra note - 4 a t 1088. 
(8) A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 1178. 
The majority judgment - by Shah J. : 
"A hire - purchase agreement is normally one 
under which an owner hires goods to another 
party called the hirer and further agrees that 
the hirer shall have an option to purchase the 
chattel when he has paid a certain sum, or 
when the hire-rental payments have reached the 
hire purchase price stipulated in the agreement*.'^  
And further held : 
"The intention of the appellants in obtaining 
the hire purchase and the allied agreements v;as 
to secure the return of loans advanced to 
their customers, and no real sale of the vehicle 
v^ as intended by the customer to the appellants. 
The transactions were merely financing transa-
ctions. ^^ 
But Subba Roa, J. in his dissenting opinion:(Said): 
"In the present case the transaction were 
admittedly hire purchase agreements". 
"The dealer and the financier were closely 
connected companies and for their own reasons 
(9) Id. at 1185. 
(10) Id. at 1187. 
they have s p l i t up the business of hire purchase 
between them. In effect and in substance, the 
dealer vdthout receiving the whole money put the 
customer in possession of the cars under the hire-
purchase agreements". '^ 
In Instalment Supply (Private) Ltd. and Another V. Union 
Of India . I t was held tha t the agreement uf h i re 
purchase with an opt ion to purchase the goods hired con-
t a ined not only a contrac t of bailment s impl ic i te r but 
a l s o an element of s a l e , v»;hich element has been seized 
upon by the l e g i s l a t u r e for the purpose of subjecting 
a t r ansac t ion l i ke t h a t to the sa les t ax . 
In Instalment Supply (Private) Ltd. V. Sales Tax Officer. 
Ahemdabad'^: The company has i t s reg is te red office in 
t h e Union Terr i tory of Delhi and c a r r i e s on business of 
f inancing the purchase of motor veh ic l e s , t-erson who 
des i r ed to buy m.otor vehicles ent-ered into hire purchase 
agreements with the company in Delhi, paid the instalment 
due in Delhi, and exercised the opt ion to buy the vehicles 
given under the agreements a lsu in Delh i . Some of these 
t r ansac t ions r e l a t ed to h i r e r s in Gujrat . At the time 
they exercised t h e i r option to buy, the vehicles were in 
(11) Id. at 1181 - 1182. 
(12) A.I.R. 1962, S.C. 52. 
(13) A.I.R. 1974, S.C. 1105. 
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the State of Gujrat. The State sought to subject them 
to sales tax under its sales tax statute. The court held 
that as at the time when the hires exercised their option 
to buy the vehicle under the hire purchase agreements, 
the vehicle were inside the State of Gujrat, that state 
was entitled tc tax the sales thus occuring. 
(II) DISTINCTION BETV/EEN CONTRACT OF SALE & AGENCY :-
The question whether a transaction is a contract 
of sale or of agency of sale of goods is material hot only 
for resolving the problems of criminal breach of trust, 
criminal misappropiation, sales-tax, but also for deter-
mining the consequences flowing from the jurisprudencial 
concept of ownership, e.g. resale of goods. 
In Gordon Woodroffe & Co. V. S.K.M.A. Majid & Co.]^ 
the question before the Supreme Court was whether the 
relationship bet.veen the parties resulted in a contract of 
sale of goods or of agency for sale- The real distinction 
between these concept lies in the fact that in the former 
the ownership in the goods passes to the buyer v.'hile in 
the latter, it remains with the principle and the agent 
is obliged to render accounts. In the light of the follov.'-
ing facts the Supreme Court held that the transaction was 
(14) A.I.R. 1967, S.C. 181. 
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one of sa le and not of agency for sa le : -
(1 ) The p l a i n t i f f - vendor and the defendants - vendees 
had fixed the p r ice of the goods. There .-/ould have 
been in the c o u r t ' s view no reason for the f ixa t ion 
if the Contract was of mere agency for sa le . 
(2) The goods were intended for r e - s a l e in united 
kingdon. 
(3) The contrac t spec i f i ca l ly declared t h a t t-.e defen-
dants were buying the goods. 
(4) There v^ as a process of trimming and reasszrtment of 
the goods in the defendants ' godowns, so -hat these 
may answer to the London standard and s l ec t ion . 
Defective p r ices were returned t o the p la in t i f f and 
the replacements obtained. The court opir.ed t ha t 
i f the defendants had been ac t ing as the egents, they, 
in the normal course of t h i n g s , would have transhipped 
the goods to London d i r ec t - There does net appear 
to be any cont rac tua l duty on the defendants to under 
take a re-assessment of the goods in t h e i r godowns 
or e lse v;here. 
(5) In several contrac ts between the p a r t i e s , the time 
for del ivery of the goods was f ixed. 
ko 
(6) "All the contract provided that time should be the 
essence of the contract".^^ 
These facts were found to be in consistent with 
a plea of a contract of agency. 
In M/S Sri Tirumala Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm V. 
Commercial Tax Officer,^^ Ramaswami J. find out the 
distinction betv«^ een a contract of sale and a contract of 
agency : 
"As a matter of law there is a distinction 
between a contract of sale and a contract of 
agency by which the agent is authorised to sell 
or buy on behalf of the principal and make over 
either the sale proceeds or the goods to the 
principal. The essence of a contract of sale is 
the transfer of title to the goods for a price 
paid or promised to be paid. The transferee in 
such a case is liable to the transferor as a 
debtor for the price to be paid and not as agent 
for the proceeds of the sale. The essence of 
agency to sell is the delivery of the goods to 
a person who is to sell them, not as his own 
property but as the property of the principal 
(15) Id. at 185. 
(16) A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 784. 
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who c o n t i n u e s t o be t h e owner of t h e goods and 
w i l l t h e r e f o r e , be l i a b l e t o account f o r the sa le 
p r o c e e d s . " 1 ^ 
In The Bhopal Sugar I n d u s t r i e s L t d . , V. Sa les Tax Off icer , 
Bhopal, ®^ The a p p e l l a n t - a s s e s s e e p r i m a r i l y c a r r i e d on 
bus iness of manufac tur ing s u g a r and i n c i d e n t a l l y t h e 
bus iness of s e l l i n g H S D O i l , p e t r o l and l u b r i c a n t s . 
The c p p e l l a n t e n t e r e d i n t o an agreement with c a l l e x ( India) 
L t d . , f o r supply of p e t r o l and pe t ro leum products t o i t 
on c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . In t h e course of i t s bus iness the 
a p p e l l a n t so ld p e t r o l t o v a r i o u s t r u c k s and o t h e r ca r 
owners and a l s o consumed p a r t of t h e p e t r o l fo r i t s cvm 
purposes . The q u e s t i o n a r o s e whether the consumption by 
t h e a p p e l l a n t of t h e q u a n t i t y of p e t r o l fo r i t s own 
purposes , could be t r e a t e d as a s a l e and t h e r e f o r e ex ig ib le 
1 0 t o s a l e s t a x . " 
The Supreme Court he ld th rough Fa ja l A l i . J . : 
"The use of t h e Hispeedol and p e t r o l by t h e appe l l an t for 
20 i t s own purposes i s not e x i g i b l e t o s a l e s t a x " . 
In b r i e f we can say t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n -
c t i c n between an agreement of s a l e and agreem.ent of agency 
(17) Id. at 787. 
(18) A.I.R. 1977, S.C. 1275. 
(19) Ibid. 
(20} Id. at 1285. 
<t l 
i s t h a t i n t h e former case t h e p r o p e r t y i s so ld by t h e 
s e l l e r as h i s own p r o p e r t y and i n t h e l a t t e r case the 
p r o p e r t y i s so ld by t h e agent not as h i s p r o p e r t y , but 
as t h e p r o p e r t y of h i s p r i n c i p a l and on h i s beha l f . 
( I I I ) . CONTRACT OF SALE & WORK CONTRACT : -
A s a l e has t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a cor . -ract 
of s e r v i c e , work o r l a b o u r . One of t h e impor tan t reasons 
why t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s necessa ry i s t h a t s a l e s t a x 
i s not payable on a c o n t r a c t of s e r v i c e even i f tne s e r v i c e 
invo lves an i n c i d e n t a l t r a n s f e r of goods.^'^ 
A c o n t r a c t of s a l e has t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
a c o n t r a c t of work and m a t e r i a l . The d i s t i n c t i o n cetween 
t h e two i s not c l e a r . Ha l sbu ry ' s Law of England:*^ 
"A c o n t r a c t of s a l e of goods must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
from a c o n t r a c t f o r work and l a b o u r . The d i s t i n -
c t i o n i s a f t e r a f i n e one . A c o n t r a c t of s a l e 
i s a c o n t r a c t whose main o b j e c t i s t h e t r a n s f e r 
of p r o p e r t y i n , and t h e d e l i v e r y of t h e possess ion 
of, a c h a t t e l i s a c h a t t e l t o t h e buyer . '^ Vhere 
t h e main o b j e c t of work under t a k e n by the payee 
of t h e p r i c e i s not t h e t r a n s f e r of c h a t t e l qua 
(21) G.R.L. Fridman, Sa le of Goods. 13-14 (1966) 
(22) H a l s b u r y ' s Law of England, 6-7 ( I I I ^ Ed . ,V .34 ) . 
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chattel, the contract is one for work 8. labour. 
The test is whether or not the work & labour 
bestowed end In anything that can properly become 
the subject of sale* neither the ownership of 
the materials, nor the value of the skill and 
labour as compared with the value of the materials, 
is conclusive, although such matters may be taken 
into consideration in determining, in the circum-
stances of a particular case, whether the contract 
is in substance one for work and labour or one 
for sale of a chattel". 
A works contract involves use of material and 
labour often it is not easy to determine whether a situation 
is that of works contract or sale as the latter may also 
involve, and usually does, use of both material and service 
(or labour). 7/hether a transaction involves works contract 
or sale depend upon fine factual situations. If the 
contract is one and indivisible the whole transaction may 
be regarded either as sale or works contract depending 
upon the particular factual situations. If the contract is 
held to be divisible. One for supply of material and 
other for use of labour the former will be 'sale' and the 
latter "Works Contract".^*^ 
(23) XIII-A.S.I.L.,360 (1977). 
4b 
For the first time a more problematic case 
before the Supreme Court was Government of Andhra Pradesh, 
V. Guntur Tobaccos Ltd.,^^ The assesses company was a 
dealer carrying on the business of redrying in its factory 
raw tobacco. It re-dried tobacco, packed in gunny, water-
proof paper bales and delivered to its customer. It changed 
the customer at a consolidated rates for redrying and for 
the packing material supplied by it. The question arose 
whether the company was liable to pay sales tax on the 
turn over for packing material. It was held by the majority 
that packing tobacco in waterproof material must be regarded 
as an integral part of the process of redrying and not 
independent of that process. 
So it was not sale. Subba Rao J. in his dissen-
ting view said : 
"The packing material is extraneous marketable 
material used for a collateral purpose, and, therefore, 
is subject of sale".^^ 
In M/S Patnaik & Co. V. State of Orissa,^^ the appellant 
company had to agreed to construct bus bodies on the chasis 
(24) A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 1396. 
(25) Id. at 1401. 
(26) A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 1655. 
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supplied by the Government. The work was to be done 
according to prescribed s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . The company 
guaranteed the durab i l i t y of the bodies for a period of 
tvi/c years and undertook to r e c t i f y the defects appearing 
during t h a t per iod. The contention of the s t a t e was that 
t he r e '.vas sa le of material used in the const ruct ion of 
the bus bodies and the t r ansac t ion was, the re fore , l iab le 
to be taxed under the sale tax law. S i k r i . J . , speaking 
for the majori ty, rie^d_iaat the re was a sa le of the 
m a t e r i a l . We observed : 
" I t i s c lear on the terms of the contrac t in 
t h i s ca5.e tha t the proper ty i n the bus body does 
not pass on i t , being placed or constructed on 
the chasis but when the whole vehicle including 
27 
the bus body i s del ivered" 
In his d i ssen t ing judgrr.ent, Shah. J . said •• 
"In my view the present contrac t i s one for work 
and not a contract for s a l e , because the contract 
i s not tha t the p a r t i e s agreed tha t the 'bus body' 
constructed by the appel lan t s h a l l be sold to the 
s t a t e of Orissa. The cont rac t i s one in which 
the appellant agreed t o const ruct 'bus bodies ' 
(27) Id . a t 1662. 
in the chasis supplied to them as bailees and 
such a contract being one for Vv'ork, the consi-
deration paid is not taxable under the Orissa 
Salex Tax Act".^^ 
In The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,Mysore V. Hindustan 
Aeronautics, Ltd., ^ the question was whether the delivery 
of railway coaches by the assessee company (Hindustan 
Aeronautics , Ltd.) to the Railway Board, was liable to 
sales tax"under the Central Sales Tax Act. Examining the 
contract between the parties the court found as its silient 
features that the Railways booked capacity of the assessee 
company for the purpose of construction of rail coaches; 
that all the material used in the construction of the coach-
es were the property of the railways before their use by 
the company to make the coaches? and that no other ^ naterial 
was being used by the ccmf-any for the construction of the 
coaches. The court held : 
"On these facts it seems to us that it is a pure 
work contract. We are unable to agree that when 
all the material used in the construction of a 
coach belongs to railways, there can be any sale 
of the coach it self".^^ 
(28) Id. at 1659. 
(29) A.I.R. 1972, S.C 744. 
(30) Id. at 749. 
In State of Himachal Pradesh V. Associated 
Hotels of India Ltd., ' there arose an interesting question. 
The assessee provides lodging to their guests and also 
served meals. A composite bill was prepared for lodging 
and board. The question was whether the sales tax could 
be imposed on the costs of meals. It was held by the 
Supreme Court that it could not be done. The transaction 
was essentially of service by the hotelier in the performa-
nce of which meals were served as part of and incidental 
to that service. 
The same views were taken by the Supreme Court 
In N.I. Caterers (India) Ltd. V. Lt. Governor of Delhi;^^ 
The result of the instant case is that the supply of food 
by a restaurant including a hotel running a restaurant to 
its customers whether resident or non residents, does not 
constitute sale. 
Again the question was before the Supreme Court 
In T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons V. State of Madras; 
whether the construction and fitting of bus bodies by the 
assessee firm of body builders on chasis provided by their 
customers were sale of goods or contract for work and labour. 
(31) A . I .R . 1974, S.C. 2309. 
(32) A . I .R . 1978, S.C. 1591. 
(33) A . I .R . 1974, S.C. 2309. 
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The bus bodies had to be constructed by the assessee with 
the specifications of the customers and fitted to the chasis 
belonging to the customers. Following its earlier decision 
in Patnaik & Co. V. State of Orissa.34 The court held that 
there was a sale of bus bodies. Khanna. J. pointed out 
the fine distinction between a contract of sale of goods 
and a contract for v.ork and labour thus* 
"A contract of sale is a contract whose main 
object is the transfer of property in, and the 
delivery of the possession of a chattel as a 
chattel to buyer. Where the main object of work 
contract undertaken by the payee of the price is 
not the transfer of a chattel qua chattel, the 
contract is one for work & labour" The sale 
of a chattel."^^ 
In State of Gujrat (Commissioner of Sales Tax,Ahemdabad) 
V. M/S Variety Body Builders;'^^ respondent M/s variety 
Body Builders entered into three contracts with the Western 
Railway Administration for construction of railway coaches 
on the underframes supplied by the said Railway Administra-
tion. The question was whether the contracts entered into 
(34) Supra note - .2^' 
(35) Supra note - 33 at 2314. 
(36) A.I.R. 1976, S.C. 2108. 
by respondent with the Railway Administrat ion for constru-
c t ion of railway coaches are cont rac t s fo r sa le of goods 
or work con t rac t . I t was held t h a t the t r ansac t i cn was one 
of work contract and not a contract of s a l e -
In Commissioner of Sales Tax,Gujrat V. M/S Sabarriati Reti 
Udyog Sahakari Mandali Ltd. ,^^ the respondent entered in to 
a cont rac t with the F.'.V.D. Gujrat for manufacture and supply 
of Klin burnt bricks to the said d e p t t . Large quan t i t i es 
of br icks were supplied under the cont rac t and received 
payment with the agreed r a t e s . The respondent maca an app l i -
ca t ion to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax to determine 
the quest ion whether the supply of br icks were sale or 
works con t rac t . The Deputy Commissioner held i t v.-as s a l e . 
Now the quest ion was before the Supreme Court. Supreme 
Court a lso held tha t i t was not the works contract , i t was 
s a l e . 
In Vanqaurd Rolling Shutters And S tee l Works V. The 
Commissioner of Sales TaXy^° there was an agreemer.t between 
the assessee (V.R.S. V/orks) and another person to fix 
shu t t e r s a t his premises. A few of the re levent terms of 
the contrac t were tha t the payment was to be made against 
documents and mater ia l was to be t r anspor ted to the s i t e 
(37) A.I.R. 1977, S,C, 197. 
(38) A.I.R. 1977, S.C. 1505* 
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at the cost of the party, and the responsibility of the 
assessee was to cease once the material left his premises, 
and the masonry work was to be done by the party at his 
own cost according to the instructions of the assessee. 
The Supreme Court held that it to be a case of v/orks 
contract as the contract was one and indivisible and fixa-
tion of the rolling shutters was a fundamental part of the 
contract itself and not merely incidental to the contract. 
In Union of India V. The Central India Machinery 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. And Others,^^ the assessee entered 
into a contract with the railways for building railway 
wagons. Under the contract, wheelsets and axel boxes were 
supplied by the railways free of costs. Ninety percent of 
the value of steel and other raw material procured by the 
assessee was to be advanced by the railways against the 
purchase of such materials by the assessee from the market. 
The assessee also used some raw materials against v/hich no 
advance was drawn,the basic question in instant case was 
whether the property in raw material on which ninety percent 
advance was made passed to the railways. After reading the 
agreement as a whole, the supreme court held that no such 
property passed to them. As no property passed to railways, 
it was a case of sale of wagons and not work contract. 
(39) A.I.R. 1977, S.C 1537. 
l)lv« 
Sarkaria. J. observed : 
"Nevertheless, if the bulk of the material used 
in the construction belongs to the manufacturer 
who sells the end-product for a price that will 
be a strong pointer to the conclusion that the 
contract is in substance one for the sale of 
goods and not for work & labour". 
In Assistant Sales Tax Officer V. B.C. Kame,'^ '' 
the question before the Supreme Court was whether sales 
tax was payable by the photographer when he "takes photo-
grapher does other photographic work and thereafter suppl-
ies the photographic prints to his client or customer." 
The Supreme Court held that this execution of job involved 
essentially skill & labour; there was no contract of sale 
of goods in this case. 
* 
In Sentirel Rolling Shutters And Engineering Co. 
(Pvt. ) Ltd. V. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra, the 
Supreme Court held that a particular contract is one for 
sale of goods or for work and labour depends upon the main 
object of the parties gathered from the terms of the 
contract, the circumstances of the transaction and the 
(40) Id. at 1547. 
« 
(41) A.I.R. 1977, S.C. 1642. 
(42) A.I.R. 1978, S.C. 1747. 
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custom of the trade". ^ 
There was no transfer of propert/ in "he rolling 
shutters by the manufacturer to the customer as a chattel. 
it is essentially a transaction for fabricatiinc component 
parts and fixing them on premises so as to constitute a 
rolling shutter. The contract is thus clearly and 
indisputably a contract for work and labour no- a contract 
for sale. 
In R.S« And Sons Engg. Works V. S.T. Commissioner 
U.P. ^y the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in 
Sentinal Rolling Shutter and Engg. Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. V. 
Commissioner of Sales Tax^ Maharashtra and the contract 
was held to be one of v;ork and labour and not of sale. 
Supreme Court has summarised the distinction 
between a contract for work or service and a contract for 
sale in M/S Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. V. State of 
Karnataka " as follows : 
"It is well setteled that the difference between 
work contract of service and contract for sale of goods is 
that in .the former, there is in the person performing v/ork 
or rendering service no property in the things produced as 
(43) Id. at 1749. 
(44^ A.I.R. 1979, S.C. 545. 
(45) Supra note -42 . 
(46) A.I.R. 1984, S.C. 744. 
5b 
a v/nole not with standing that a part or even 
the whole of materials used by him had been his 
i-roperty. In the case uf contract for sale, 
the thing produced as a whole has individual 
existence as the sole :wroperty of the party who 
produced it some time brfore delivery and the 
property therein 't^assad unly under the contract 
relating thereto to the >jther party for price. 
It is necessary, ther9f>^ re, in every case for the 
courts to find out whetner in essence there v/as 
any agreement to work fjr a stipulated consideration". 
In the instant case Supreme Court held that it was 
contract for work and not a contract for sale.*^ ' 
Irt XyS Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. V. State of 
Orrisa, the Supreme court observed : 
"In a Contract for sal:-, the main object of the 
parties is to transfer property in and delivery of 
possession of a chattel as a chattel to the buyer", 
and held : 
"The function of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. was 
the implementation of the said enstrument and the 
contract betv;een the Government of India and the 
(47) Id. at 748. 
(48) A.I.R. 1984, S.C. 753. 
5if 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. was only a v-'orks 
contract and not a contract of sale". 
50 In State of Tamil Nadu V. Anandam Vishwanathen, 
the assessee had entered into contracts with the univer-
sities and other educational institutions in the country 
for printing question papers for the said educational 
institutions. The assessee in the demand note prepared, 
gave the charges for printing, blocks, packing charges, 
handling charges, delivery charges, postage value of 
papers and value of packing materials seperately in the 
relevent assessment year. 
The question involved is, whether the taxable 
turnover should also include the printing and block making 
charges or not. Following its earlier decision In Hindus-
tan Aeronautics Ltd's Case.~*^  Supreme Court held that the 
contract in this case is one, having regard to the nature 
of the job to be done and the confidence reposed for v.ork 
to be done for remuneration & sup{.ly of paper was just 
incidental. Hence, the entire price for the printed question 
papers would have been entitled to be excluded from the 
taxable turnover." 
(49) Id . a t 757. 
(50) A. I .R . 1989, S.C. 962. 
(51 ) Supra note - 46 . 
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In b r i e f , a c o n t r a c t of s a l e of goods i s one i n 
which some goods a r e so ld o r r a t e t o be so ld for a p r i c e . 
But where no goods a re so ld , and t h e r e i s only t h e doing 
o r r e n d e r i n g of some work o r l a b o u r , t h e n t h e c o n t r a c t 
i s on ly of work and l abour and not of s a l e of goods. 
( I V ) . CONTRACT OF SALE AND EXCHANGE : 
When two persons mutua l ly t r a n s f e r t h e ownership 
of one t h i n g fo r t h e ownership of a n o t h e r , n e i t h e r t h i n g 
o r bo th t h i n g s being money, o n l y , t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i s c a l l ed 
an ' e x c h a n g e ' . A t r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t y i n complet ion of 
anexchange can be made only i n manner provided fo r t h e 
t r a n s f e r of such p r o p e r t y by s a l e . 
The d e f i n i t i o n of exchange i n S.118 of Trans fe r of 
P r o p e r t y Act i s not l i m i t e d t o immovable p r o p e r t y , but i t 
e x t a n d s a l s o t o b a r t e r of goods . I t i s c l e a r t h e r e f o r e , 
t h a t bo th under t h e Sale of Good Act and t h e Trans fe r of 
P r o p e r t y Act , s a l e i s a t r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t y i n t h e goods 
o r of t h e ownership i n immovable p r o p e r t y f o r a money 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . But i n exchange t h e r e i s r e c i p r o c a l t r a n s f e r 
of i n t e r e s t t he immovable p r o p e r t y , t h e corresponding 
t r a n s f e r of i n t e r e s t i n t h e movable p r o p e r t y being denoted 
(52) S . 118, Transfe r of P r o p e r t y Act . 
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by the word 'barter'. The difference betv^ een a sale and 
an exchange is this, that informer price of paid in whilst 
money, in latter it is paid in goods by way of barter. 
The Supreme Court In Commissioner of Income Tax, 
54 
Andhra Pradesh, V. M/S Motors & General Stores (P) Ltd., 
differentiated sale from exchange or barter J 
"The presence of money consideration is an 
essential element of sale. If the consideration 
is not money but some other valuable consideration 
it may be an exchange or barter but not a sale". 
In the instant case, the assessee company was a 
private limited company ovdng a cinema. In persuance of 
an agreement to sell a cinema house v/ith all its equip-
ments and fitting as a going concern for a consideration 
of Rs. 1,20,000 the assessee company executed a deed called 
'the exchange deed' in favour of vendee and consideration 
for the same was received by the assessee company in the 
shape of transfer of 5 percent tax free cumulative prefe-
rence shares held by vendee (Shri Flam Sugar 2, Industries 
Ltd, Bobbilli of the face value of Rs. 1,20,00C) separate 
valuation was given in the deed for the immovable property. 
(53) Chitty on Contracts, 582 (22nd Ed., V. II) 
(54) A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 200. 
(55) Id. at 202. 
movable property and goodwill of the business. The sole 
question for determination was whether the transaction in 
question was a sale for the purpose of income tax. 
It was held by the Supreme Court the transaction 
was in essence one of exchange and not sale and therefore, 
the income tax authorities v;ere not entitled to treat it 
as sale for income tax. The main distinction between sale 
and exchange is, in sale consideration must be money 
consideration known as price and if goods are given in 
exchange for goods, it is known as barter or exchange-
(V). SALE AND AGREEMENT TO SELL : 
AGREEMENT TO SELL :-
"An agreement to sell is simply a contract, and 
as such can not give rise to any rights in the buyer v.hich 
are based on ownership or possession but only to claims 
for breach of contract".^^ 
In English law. Sec.2 (5) of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 : 
A contract of sale is called an agreem.ent to sell 
where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take 
(56) Benjamin's 'Sale of Goods*, 26 (2^^ Ed., 1981). 
6b 
place at a future time or subject to some condition later 
to be fulfilled. 
Sec. 4(3) of Sale of Goods Act, 1930 makes the 
clear difference between sale and agreement to sell in the 
following words i 
"'.Vhere under a contract of sale the property in 
the goods is transferred from the seller to the 
buyer, the contract is called a sale, but where 
the transfer of the property in the goods is to 
take place at a future time or subject to some 
condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract 
is called an agreement to sell". 
In Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit V. M^S Budh Prakash 
Jai Prakash, the Supreme Court held : 
A sale of goods and an agreem.ent for the sale of 
goods are treated as two distinct and seperate 
matters, the vital point of distinction between 
them being that whereas in a sale there is a 
transfer of property in the goods from the seller 
to the buyer, there is none in an agreement to 
sell.^^ 
(57) A.I.R. 1954, S.C. 459. 
(58) Ibid. 
bx 
In The Instalment Supply Ltd. V» S.T«0. Ahemdabad, the 
Supreme Court distinguished both of thera : 
An agreement to sell is a contract pure and simple 
whereas a sale is a contract plus a conveyance. 
By an agreement to sell a 'jus in personam' is 
created, by a sale a jus in rem.'also is transferred. 
Where goods have been sold and the buyer makes 
default the seller may sue foi" the conxract price 
in the court of "goods bargained and scid", but 
when an agreement to buy is broken, the seller's 
normal remedy is an action for unliquidated 
damages. If an agreement to sell be broken by the 
seller the buyer has only a personal remedy against 
the seller. The goods are still the property of 
the seller, and he can dispose of them as he likes. 
But if there has been a sale, and the seller 
breaks his engagement to deliver the gccds, the 
buyer has not only a personal remedy against the 
seller, but also the usual proprietory remedies in 
respect of the goods them.selves. In many cases, 
too, he can follow the goods into the hands of 
third parties. Again, if there be an agreement of 
sale and the goods are destroyed, the loss as a 
(59) A.I.R. 1974, S.C. 1105. 
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rule falls on the seller, while if there has been 
a sale, the loss as a rule falls upon the buyer 
though the goods may have never come to his 
possession.60 
In brief, we can summarise the distinction 
between the two : 
(1) In a sale, the risk of loss, if any, of the 
goods is on the buyer. But in an agreement 
to sell, the seller remains the owner of the 
goods, and, therefore runs all the risks. 
(2) In a sale, if the buyer commits default, the 
seller may sue him for the price, that is, 
for specific enforcement of the contract. In 
an agreement to sell, the seller's only remedy 
is to sue for damages for breach. 
*•*•• 
* 
(60) Id. at 1108. 
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C H A P T E R - IV. 
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY & RISK : 
( I ) . TRANSFER OF PROPERTY : -
In t h e law r e l a t i n g t o s a l e of goods, " the passing 
of P rope r ty S^  Risk" c o n s t i t u t e s t h e most impor tan t element. 
The essence of s a l e i s t h e t r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t y of the 
ownership or g e n e r a l p r o p e r t y i n t h e goods from s e l l e r t o 
buyer fo r a p r i c e . The q u e s t i o n whether and a t what time 
t h e p rope r ty p a s s e s t o t h e buyer i s i n t h e o r y depend upon 
t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t y . 
S e c t i o n 2 (11) of t h e s a l e of Goods Act , 1930 i s 
based on Engl i sh Sa le of Goods which says : 
" F r o p e r t / " means t h e g e n e r a l p r o p e r t y i n goods, 
and not merely a s p e c i a l p r o p e r t y . 
The b a s i c t h e s i s of t h e law i n r e s p e c t of t h e 
pas s ing of p r o p e r t y i n t h e goods i s a n e g a t i v e one, according 
t o Sec . 18 of t h e Sa le of Goods Act "where t h e r e i s a 
c o n t r a c t fo r t h e s a l e of u n a s c e r t a i n e d goods , no p rope r ty 
i n t h e goods i s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e buyer u n l e s s and u n t i l 
t h e goods a re a s c e r t a i n e d " . This i s not t o say t h a t t h e 
p r o p e r t y i n t h e goods w i l l pass when t h e y a r e a s c e r t a i n e d 
fo r t h i s also depends upon the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s . 
"•(Vhere there i s a contract for the sa l e of spec i f ic or 
ascer ta ined goods the property i n them i s t rans fe r red to 
the buyer at such time as the p a r t i e s to the contract 
intend i t to be t r a n s f e r r e d " . ' 
In Commissioner of Sale Tax, Nagpur, V. Husenali 
Adamji and Co.f a res ident of chanda i n the erstv/hile 
Central i-rovinces, entered into an agreement v;ith the 
Western India Match Co. Ltd. for the supply of savar logs 
during reason 1947-48. The goods to be supplied under the 
contract were to be dispatched by A from railway s ta t ion in 
the cen t ra l provinces . The gjuds were to be measured 
under the supervis ion of the c^rpany's factory man3:ar at 
Arrbernath in the province of Lonbay on a r r i v a l of t-.a goods 
a t the fac tory . I t v;as hold tna t i -ort ies did not ir.tend 
to i-ass pro. e r ty in the goods u n t i l the buyer perf:-r-^ed the 
said a c t s . The Supremo Court fur ther held : the c:,ntract 
was for sale of unascertained goods and consequent!/ the 
property in them could not under 3ec.1S of the Sale of Goods 
Act pass unless and u n t i l the goods were ascer ta ined. 
The condit ion precedent to the passing of property 
under a contract of sa le tha t the goods are ascer ta ined. 
(1) Sec.19(1) of the Sale of Goods Act. 1930. 
(2) A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 887. 
66 
It was held in P.S.N.S. Ambalavana Chettiar and Co.Ltd. 
and Another. V« Express Newspapers Ltd., that the condition 
Is not fulfilled where there is a contract for sale of a 
portion of a specified larger stock. Till the portion is 
identified and appropriated to the contract, no property 
passes to the buyer. 
In brief, the property in the goods from seller 
to the buyer passes when goods are ascertained. 
(II). PASSING OF PROPERTY IN SPECIFIC GOODS ;-
'Specific Goods' are defined under Section 2(14) 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1930, (S. 62(1 ) of English Act) 
as "goods identified and agreed upon at the time of contract 
of sale is made". The section clearly shows that seller 
and buyer must both be quite clear about the identity of 
the goods in question and there should be no ambiguity 
whatsoever about it. From the decided cases'^  of the Suprem.e 
Court there should be following ingredients • 
(i) The goods must be in existence at the time of the 
contract of sale-
(ii) They must be appropriated towards the contract of 
sale; 
(3) A . I . R . 1968, S.C. 741 . 
(4) A.V.Thomas V.Deputy Commissioner of A g r i c u l t u r e A.I .R. 
1964, S.C.569 and R.N.Mahato V . S t a t e of M.P.1970(1) 
S.C.C. 25 and Conso l ida ted Coffee Ltd . V Coffee Board 
Banglore A-I .R . 1980, S.C.1468. 
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( i i i ) They must be iden t i f i ed and agreed upon at the 
time when the contract of sa le i s made. It i s not 
su f f i c ien t t h a t they are capable of i den t i f i c a t i on 
a t the time of contract of sa le i s made. 
There i s a difference of opinion, whether future 
goods be speci f ic or not. Atiyah^ and Chamer^ suggest t h a t 
future goods can never be spec i f i c for the purpose of 
t h i s r u l e . 
According to the provis ions of the Anglo-Arsrican 
and Anglo-Indian law embodied in the foregoing s t a tu tes the 
t r a n s f e r of property in goods, as d i s t i n c t from delivery 
of goods, i s governed by the i n t e n t i o n of p a r t i e s . ' Sec.19 
of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 provides : 
( i ) V^ere there i s a contract for the Sale of Specific 
or ascer ta ined goods the property in them i3 
t ransfer red to the buyer a t such time as th? pa r t i e s 
to the contract intend i t to be t r ans f e r r ec . 
( i i ) For the purpose of asce r ta in ing the in tent ion of 
the pa r t i e s regaixi s h a l l be had to the terr.s of the 
contract the conduct of the p a r t i e s and circumstances 
(5) P .S . Atiyah, The Sale of Goods Act, 28 (4th Ed.,1971) 
(6) Chamer's, Sale of Goods, 202 (15th Ed.) 
(7) Sec. 17(1) of the English S.G.Act, Sec. 18(1) of The 
American Uniform sales Act, Sec. 19(1 ) of the Sale of 
Goods Act. 
7b 
of the case. 
(iii) Unless a different intention appears, the rules 
contained in Sec 20 to 24 are rules for ascertain-
ing the intention of the parties as to the time at 
v/hich the property in the goods is to pass to the 
buyer. 
Sec. 20 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 provides : 
"where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of 
specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the 
goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and 
it is immaterial whether the time of payment of the price 
or the time cf delivery of the goods, or both is postponded" 
The basic conditions for the passing of property 
in specific c^ods to apply are given as follows : 
(i) The Cwods must be specific. 
(ii) The goods must be in a deliverable state. 
(iii) The contract must be unconditional. 
On the fulfilment of these conditions the property would 
pass even though the delivery of the goods or the paym.ent 
of the price, or both, is postponed. 
Deliverable state means such state'of things that 
7: 
the buyer v;oulcl under the contract be bound to ta.<e their 
delivery.^ For example, A purchases a table which, accor-
ding to the contract, has to be polished by the seller 
before delivery, the table is not in a deliverable state. 
It will become in a deliverable state when the saie has 
been polished. The property in such a case woulc not pass 
at the time of the making of the contract. 
In Badri Prasad V. State of M.P. J^ the s-ate of 
M.P. had sold by public auction the timber produce of a 
forest was thus described in the contract : 
"The forest produce sold and purchased ccnsist of 
all standing trees bearing hammer marks cf margi-
nally shown device at base and breast height. 
All fel^ led trees marked at the buttend and stumps 
with the device shown in the margin." 
The entire area where the timber was spread was 
divided into four sections and the price was also to be 
paid in four instalments. The contractor paid the first 
but defaulted in the peyment of the second and, -herefore, 
(8) According to Sec. 2(3) of the Sale of Goods ict,1930, 
which provides- "goods are said to be in a 'deliverable 
state' when they are in such state that the buyer would 
under the contract be bound to take delivery of them". 
(9) R.K. Bangia- Sale of Goods, 57 (III^ Ed. 1985). 
(10) A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 58. 
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i n accordance with the terms of the contract , he was 
prevented from removing the t imber lying in the remaining 
t h r e e sec t ions . The timber of these sections v/as then 
destroyed in an accidenta l f i r e . 
In such circum.stances the loss obviously f a l l s 
upon the party who i s the ovmer of the goods at the time 
of acc iden t . The sole quest ion before the Supreme Court 
fo r determination, therefore , was whether the property in 
the whole of the timber sold had passed to the contractor 
immediately at the time of s a l e , regardless of the fact 
t h a t the department had the r i g h t t o stop the removal of 
the goods i f a defaul t was made in the payment of an 
i n s t a lmen t . Raghuber Dayal J . held : 
"The contract was uncondi t ional , the goods sold 
were spec i f i c . They were in a deliverable s t a t e 
and therefore the property i n the goods did pass 
a t the time when contrac t was made. In the present 
case, the payment allowed by instalments i s to be 
deemed payment in f u l l at the time of del ivery of 
the goods sold". ''' 
In Ram Narain Mahto V. S t a t e of M.?.,"*^ t h e appel l -
ant R.N. Mahto entered in to a cont rac t for purchase of 
(11 ) Id . a t 64. 
(12) (1970) I . S.C.C.25. 
timber from the Jagerdar of 5onapur by deed dated August 5, 
1956. In 1951 the jager was taken over by the State under 
the M.P. Abolishan of Property Rights Act of 1951. As the 
appellant could not get the logs of timber agreed to be 
sold to him from the forests of jagerdar, because of the 
statute, he filed the present suit for compensation on 
several courts. One of them v^ as for logs of timber standing 
on forests which could not be cut. That is, they were 
standing trees. The Supreme Court disallowed the claim of 
the appellant and observed, "under the deed all trees 
standing in the forests in the 9 villages were not agreed 
to be sold". It was provided that trees 'Alth logs of 2 
feet or m.ore in girth were to be cut, and supj-lied. The 
Jagerdar was to cut the trees at his expense to supply the 
logs. Only logs with a girth of not less than 2 feet were 
to be supplied after the trees were cut by the Jagerdar. 
Goods to be sold were therefore unascertained, that the logs 
of timber agreed to be supplied had no existence as undivided 
and chattle until as the trees v^ ere cut and severed from 
the land. The Supreme Court further held, "If the goods are 
unascertained than it is well satteled that a contract for 
unascertained goods is not a complete sale, but only to a 
promise to sell".''^ 
(13) Id. at 30. 
i 'z 
An important pronouncement was made by the Supreme 
Court in Collector, Customs V. Pednekar & Co«^ which deals 
with the question of passing of property under section 20 
of the Sale of Goods Act. 
Respondent fid had a licence to import goods at 
any port in India. Fart of the goods were imported at the 
Bombay port and the rest he wanted to arrange through the 
Calcutta Port. He contracted with two Japanaese firms for 
import of a certain number of industrial sev.dnc machines 
and 208 dozen of oscillating rock-shafts. The respondent 
seemed to have some financial difficulties for release of 
the goods ,at Bombay. The Bombay and Calcutta Cycle Co. 
respondent No.2, agreed to guarantee the letter of credit 
of the respondent No.1, if the sam^ e was opened v/ith their 
brokers at Delhi. On Feb.20, 1959, when the goods v^fere in 
transit on the seas respondent No.1 agreed to sell to the 
cycle CO.- certain heads of industrial sewing machines and 
200 dozen shafts out of 208 dozen. 
The custom authorities confiscated the goods and 
levied penalties both on the respondent and the cycle co., 
on the ground that the property in the goods had passed to 
this company under Sec.20 of the Sale of Goods Act, the 
goods being specific. 
(14) A.I.R. 1976, S.C. 1408. 
to 
The question before the court was v/hether -the-
the property in the goods had passed to the cycle co., 
before their arrival at a port in India. 
Calcutta High Court held that the goods were 
specific goods in deliverable state. 
On appeal, the Supreme court held thus that under 
the Feb.20, 1959, agreement only 200 dozen rock shafts out 
of 208 dozen had to be sold to the cycle co. The eight 
dozen rock shaft had therefore, to be selected and the rest 
of 200 dozen goods had to be ascertained and appropriated 
to the contract. The goods under the contract were by no 
means specific ones. No property in the goods could pass 
to the cycle co. Unless the goods arrived at the port and 
the selection process was complete. 
"The case is an apt illustration of what amounts 
to 'specific goods', but its conclusion that when the 
transaction is indivisible the property in the goods cannot 
pass.at different times is of for reaching importance and 
needs to be fully studied and noted". '^  
In brief, in the contract of sale of specific goods, 
in deliverable state property passes at the time of making 
contract subject to a contract to the contrary. 
(15) I.e. Saxena, Annual Survey of Indian Law, 
28 (Vol. XII, 1976). 
/o 
(III). PASSING OF PROPERTY IN UNASCERTAINED GOODS :-
'Unascertained goods' are nov;here defined by the 
English Act or the Indian Act or the American Uniform 
Sales Act, but these Acts do use the expression by way of 
contract to 'specific goods'. Unascertained goods m.eans 
which are neither agreed upon nor identified at the time 
when the contract of sale is made. 
'Future goods' have been defined by Sec. 2(6) of 
the Sale of Goods Act, which provides : 
"Future goods", means goods to be manufactured or 
produced or acquired by the seller after the making of the 
contract of sale'. 
The passing of property in unascertained goods, 
Black burn said : 
"V/here from the terms of an executory agreement to 
sell unspecified goods in vendor is to dispatch the 
goods, or to do any thing to them that cannot be 
done till the goods are appropriated, he has the 
right to choose what the goods shall be; and the 
property is transferred the moment the dispatch or 
other act has commenced, for them an appropriation 
is made finally and conclusively by the authority 
/ / 
conferred in the agreement, and in Lord Coke's 
language, 'the certainity and thereby the property, 
begins by election'. But however, clearly the 
vendor may have expressed an intention to choose 
particular goods, and, however, expensive may have 
been his preparations for performing the agreement 
with those particular goods, yet until the Act has 
usually commenced the appropriation is not final 
for it is not made by the authority of the other 
party, nor binding upon him".^° 
Benjamin said : 
"The rule is that primafaci, the property v.lll not 
pass till the goods are completly made and appro-
priated by mutual assent". ^ "^  
If there is a contract for the sale of unascertained 
or future goods the property therein does not pass at the 
time of making of the contract of sale of goods. The 
property in unascertained goods cannot pass until the goods 
are ascertained.'° Similarly, if the subject matter is 
19 future goods, the contracts operates as an agreement to sell 
(16) Black burn On Sale, 138 (3^ Ed.) -'^' 
(17) Benjamin On Sale, 344 (8^^ Ed. ) 
(18) Sec. 18. 
(19) Sec.6(3),v;hich provides:"where by a contracx -v? ?aie 
the seller purports fo effect a present sale of future 
goods, the contract operates as an agreement to sell 
the goods". 
t(J 
According to Sec. 19(1 ) the prcperty will pass v/hen the 
parties intend it to pass, and in the absence of a 
contrary intention, the property will pass according to 
Sec. 23(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, which provides : 
"'rVhere there is a contract for the sale of unascer-
tained or future good by description and goods of 
that description and in a deliverable state are 
unconditionally appropriated to the contract, 
either by the seller with the assent of the buyer 
or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the 
property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer. 
Such assent may be expressed or implied, and may 
be given either before or after the appropriation 
is made"• 
It is clear from the Sec. 23(1 ) that in a contract 
of sale of unascertained or future goods property in goods 
will pass when the follovving requirements are fulfilled : 
(i) There is appropriation of the goods to the contract 
either by the seller or by the buyer. 
(ii) The appropriation of the goods is made by the 
party with the consent of other. 
(iii) The goods appropriated to the contract are of the 
ro 
same description as given in the contract and in 
a deliverable state, and. 
(iv) The appropriation is unconditional. 
The above conditions were also observed by the 
Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras V. 
Mysore Chromite Ltd.*^  In the instant case, the Supreme 
Court observed that the requirement of Sec. 23 of the Sale 
of Goods Act, 1930, is not only that there shall be 
appropriation of the goods to the contract, but that such 
appropriation must be made unconditionally. In this case 
an assessee company carrying on its business in India 
shipped the goods to American and European buyers outside 
India under bill of lading issued in its own name. Under 
the contract it was not obliged to part with the bill of 
lading until the bill of exchange drawn by it on the buyer's 
Bank in London where the irrevocable letter of credit was 
opened. Upon the terms of the contract in this case, and 
the course of dealings between the parties the property in 
the goods could not have passed to the buyers earlier than 
the date when the bill of exchange was accepted by the 
buyer's Bank. This always took place in London. It was 
held that at the earliest the property in the goods passed 
(20) A.I.R. 1955, S,C. 98. 
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in London, where the bill of lading was handed over to 
the buyers Bank against the acceptance of the relative 
bill of exchange and that the sales took place outside 
British India and ex-hypothesi the profits derived from 
such sales arose outside British - India. The Supreme 
Court said this is further elaboi^ted by Sec.25 of the 
Act, which provides that "where there is a contract for 
sale of specific goods or where goods are subsequently 
appropriated to the contract, the seller may, by the terms 
of contract or appropriation, reserve the right of disposal 
of the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled. In 
such a case not with standing the delivery of goods to the 
buyer, or to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose of 
transmission to the buyer, the property in the goods does 
not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the 
seller are fulfilled. 
The Supreme Court in 1959^^ held that in this 
particular case the contract was for sale of unascertained 
goods and consequently the property in them could not 
under Sec. 18 of the Act pass under and until the goods v;ere 
ascertained. 
Justice Ramaswami explained the principle of 
passing of property in unascertained goods in Carona Sahu Co»V. 
(21 ) Supra note - 2 at 839. 
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State of Maharashtra^^ thus : 
The law is well established that in the Ccse of 
contract for sale of unascertained goods tie 
property does not pass to the purchaser ur_less 
there is unconditional appropriation, of tie 
goods, in a deliverable state to the contract. 
In the case of such a contract, delivery c: the 
goods by the vendor to the common carrier is an 
appropriation sufficient to pass the property. 
But there is a difference in the legal effect of 
delivering goods to a common carrier on the one 
hand and shipment on board a ship under a bill 
of lading on the other hand, v;here goods are 
delivered on board of avessel to be carried, and 
a bill of lading is taken, the delivery bv the 
seller is not delivery to the buyer, but -z the 
captain as bailee for delivery to the person 
indicated by the bill of lading. The seller may 
therefore take the bill of lading to his C'vn 
order. The effect of this transaction is zo control 
the possession of the captain and made the captain 
accountable to delivery of the goods to t-e seller 
as the holder of the bill of lading. The bill 
of lading is the symbol of property, and ty so 
(22) A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 1153. 
8Z 
taking the bill of lading the seller keeps to 
himself the right of demanding possession from the 
captain, and this is consistent even v.lth a special 
term that the- goods are shipped on account of and 
at the risk of the buyer.^^ 
In the instant case "^^  the Supreme Court held that 
no property in the goods passed to the buyer for the bill 
of lading was taken in the name of seller and deliverable 
only on pa/ment of price. 
OK 
In P« Manshnahka Ltd. V. Income Tax Commissioner, 
the Supreme Court held tha t the goods were by the b i l l of 
l ad ing , made de l iverab le to the order of s e l l e r or his 
agent i s a primafaci r e se rva t ion of the r ight of the 
d i sposa l so as to prevent the passing of property to the 
purchaser . 
'Atiere both the p a r t i e s have subsequently assented 
to the appropriat ion of some spec i f i c goods to f u l f i l the 
agreement, no d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s ; the effect i s then the 
same as i f they had from the f i r s t agreed upon the sale of 
t hose spec i f ic goods. The s e l e c t i o n of the goods by the 
one par ty and the adoption of t h a t act by the other converts 
what was a mere agreement to s e l l in to an ac tua l sale , 
(23) Id. at 1155. 
(24) Supra note - 22. 
(25) A.I.R. 1967, S.C 1626. 
and the property thereby passes . 26 '//here the pucca 
de l i ve ry orders did not r e l a t e to any speci f ic lo t of 
goods and the contract v/as for s a l e of unascertained 
goods by desc r ip t ion , and the s e l l e r did not have the 
necessary cont ro l over the goods ly ing in the m i l l s ' 
godown and therefore could not appropr ia te them to the 
con t rac t even '.vith the consent of the buyer, i t was held 
t h a t property did not pass to the buyer under Sec.23. 
In Pyshpapriya devi V. S t a t e of Maharashtra, ^^ 
the p l a i n t i f f - appellant entered i n to a contract with the 
second defendant - respondent, h is b ro ther for cutt ing of 
t r e e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r f o r e s t . Es. 15000/- were to be paid 
on the date of contract and balance within six months. 
Clause 5 of the contract provided t h a t , "the contractor 
w i l l not remove any fores t produced from the s i t e . . . . and 
u n t i l the logs are checked and passed by the Estate Forest 
S t a f f . 29 
The second defendent - respondent, having been 
affected by the M.?. Aboli t ion of Propr ie ta ry Rights Act, 
1950, got an order of s tay from the Supreme Court against 
the S ta te on 27"^ *^  March, 1951. However l a t e r his pe t i t ion 
(26) R.K. Abichandani, The Sale of Goods Act, 
163 (Vth Ed.,1990) 
(27) Jugg i l a l Kamlapat V. Pratapmal Flameshv;ar, 
A.I.R. 1978, S.C. 389 a t 397. 
(28) A.I.R. 1978, S.C. 1076. 
(29) Id. a t 1079. 
Hi 
was dismissed and the stay order was vacated. The 
government there upon did not permit the plaintiff -
appellant to remove the already cut trees, unless he 
paid Es. 35000/- to it. The plaintif- appellant so paid 
this amount and removed the cut trees. He then sought 
to recover this amount mth interest from, the government 
on the ground that he had already paid this amount to 
his brother, the second defendant- respondent. The 
Supreme Court stressed the following two points :-
(i) The contract was clearly not for sale of goods, 
but for transfer of right in property. 
(ii) If cut trees (if there were any) were in tne 
nature of unascertained goods, and the property 
therein would pass only as under Sec.23 of the 
Sale of Goods Act.^^ 
It is clear from different dicisions given by the 
Supreme Court that the passing of property in unascertained 
or future goods, the elements which are necessary are as 
following : 
(i) Appropriation of the goods made by one party with 
the consent of others and the goods appropriated 
to the contract are of the same description as 
given in the contract and in a deliverable state 
and, 
(30) Id. at 1080. 
» j 
The appropriat ion i s uncondit ion. 
Section 23(2) gives an example of uncondi-ional 
appropr i a t ion . "V/here, in persuance of the contract , the 
s e l l e r de l ive r s the goods to the buyer or to a c a r r i e r 
o r o ther ba i lee (whether named by the buyer or not) for 
the purpose of t ransmission to the buyer, and does not 
reserve the r igh t of d isposa l , he i s deemed to have 
uncondi t ional ly appropriated the goods to the con t rac t . " 
In Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi V. M/3 P.M. 
31 
Rat hod and Co., the assessee were a firm of manufacturers 
of perfumery and hair oils at Ratlam and their goods were 
sold throughout India. The goods were sent to the 
customers either by V.P.P. (value prepaid) or by rail. 
In the instant case assessee sent their Bank Draf-s 
received from buyer (or Post Office) for being cashed and 
credited to their account at Bombay. The sole cuestion 
for determination was where were the income, profits and 
gains received or were deemed to received. The Supreme 
Court said the Post Office was not the agent of tr.e buyer. 
Under the V.P.P. system the post office became an agent 
of the seller for the recovery of price and delivered the 
goods it was liable in damages to the sellers. Under the 
(31) A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 1394. 
Ho 
V.P.P. system the seller retained control over the goods 
right upto the time the goods were delivered to the buyer 
against pa'/ment of price and therefore, the contract 
would fall under Sec25 of the Act. The property in the 
goods passed at the place where the price which included 
profits v/as paid. 
Sub clause (1 ) of Sec.25 provides that where there 
is a contract for sale of specific goods, or where goods 
are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller 
may by terris of the contract or appropriation reserve the 
right of disposal of the goods until certain conditions 
are fulfilled and if he does so, the legal consequence 
mentioned in the section flows, namely, that in such a case 
not with standing the delivery of goods to a buyer or to 
a carrier or bailee for transmission to the buyer, the 
property in the goods does not pass to the buyer, until the 
conditions imposed by the seller are fulfilled.32 
(32) Consolidated Coffee Ltd. V. Coffee Board, Banglore, 
A.I.R. 1980, S.C. 1468 at 1495. 
bi 
(IV). TRANSFER OF RISK :-
If the goods perish after the contract has been 
formed, the agreeinent may be terminated. 
By Sec.3 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1933 : 
"'.'fl-iere there is an agreement to sell specific goods, 
and subsequently the goods without any fault on 
the part of the seller or buyer perish or become 
so damaged as no longer to ansv;er to their descri-
ption in the agreement before the risk passes to 
the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided". 
Goods are said to be at the risk of a particular 
party when the cost of their loss or depreciation falls on 
him. The principles attributing that loss are distinct 
from the rules governing liability for non-performance of 
the contract. The general principle attributing the risk 
is stated in Sec.26 : 
"Unless otherwise agreed, the goods renain at 
the seller's risk until the property tnerein is 
transferred to the buyer, but when the property 
therein is transferred to the buyer, the goods 
are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been 
made or not". 
^o 
In M/S Marwar Tent Factory V. Union of India,^^ 
the firm entered into a contract for supply of t en t s to 
Direc tor General of Supplies and Disposal. In accordance 
with the said terms of the cont rac t the goods v;ere to be 
inspec ted a t the premises of the firm and a f t e r the same 
being passed by the Inspector , the goods had to be despatched 
t o the consignee. The term of de l ive ry under the contract 
was F.U.R. place of despatch. I t was fur ther agreed between 
the p a r t i e s tha t 95% of the p r ice was payable on proof of 
despatch and production of the inspec t ion note. The balance 
of 5/b was to be paid a f t e r r ece ip t of the goods in good 
condi t ion by the consignee. One consignment of 1500 tents 
v/as despatched to the consignee by the firm Under Railway 
Receipt . The consignee reported t h a t 224 t en t s out of a 
s a l e consignment had not been received at des t ina t ion and 
consequently a sum representing f u l l pr ice of 224 tents 
inc lus ive of sa les tax was deducted from the amounts due to 
the firm under another con t rac t . 
The Supreme Court held t h a t the property in the 
goods together with the r i sk passed from the s e l l e r to the 
buyer i . e . from consignor to consignee as soon as the goods 
were loaded in the railway wagons a t place of despatch as 
per terms of de l ive ry . Therefore, i t could not be said that 
(33) A.I.R. 1990, S.C. 1753. 
6U 
t he r i s k throughout remained with the firm u n t i l the goods 
were ac tua l ly del ivered to the consignee. 
I t could not a lso be said t h a t the property in 
t e n t s did not pass u n t i l the same were ac tua l ly delivered 
t o the consignee and the consignee was not l i ab l e for 
l o s s of t e n t s during the period of t r a n s i t by the railways. 
On cons idera t ion of the place of de l ivery as well as the 
terms of de l ivery embodied in the schedule of acceptance 
of tender , the property in the goods alongwith the r isk 
i n the goods passed from the firm to the consignee when 
the goods were del ivered and despatched. The consignee 
was the re fore , l i a b l e for short de l ivery and i t s pr ice , 
could not be deducted from the o t h e r b i l l s of the 
consignor. 
***** 
*** 
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C H A P T E R - V 
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 
( I ) . DELIVERY : -
I t i s t h e duty of t h e s e l l e r t o d e l i v e r t h e goods 
and of t h e buyer t o accept and pay f o r them, i n accordance 
w i t h t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t of S a l e ' . The g e n e r a l 
p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t t h e p rope r ty i n c l u d e s t h e r i g h t t o 
p o s s e s s i o n , and i t i s t h e r e f o r e t h e du ty of the s e l l e r to 
comple te t h e c o n t r a c t by g iv ing t h e buyer pos se s s ion , 
whe the r t h e goods be i n the hands of h imself o r of a 
t h i r d par ty* and t h e buye r ' s o b l i g a t i o n i s c o r r e l a t i v e , 
t o a ccep t t h e goods and pay t h e p r i c e . 
S e c . 3 1 , of Sale of Goods Act , 1930, i s mainly 
based on p r o v i s i o n s of Sec.27 of E n g l i s h Sa le of Goods Act. 
I t should be noted t h a t t h e l e g a l meaning of 
" d e l i v e r y " i s very much d i f f e r e n t from t h e popular 
meaning- In law ' d e l i v e r y ' means, " v o l u n t a r y t r a n s f e r 
of p o s s e s s i o n " which i s very d i f f e r e n t from the despatch 
of goods . 
The mode of d e l i v e r y i s s t a t e d i n Sec.33 of Sale 
of Goods Act 1930, i n t he se te rms : 
(1) Sec . 31 of The Sale of Goods Act , 1930. 
"Delivery of goods sold may be made by doing any 
thing v;hich the parties agree shall be treated 
as delivery or which has the effect of putting 
the goods in the possession of the buyer or of 
any person authorised to hold them on his behalf". 
Delivery of the goods to the buyer may be made by 
any method which the parties agree shall consitute delivery. 
For example^ it may be agreed that the goods shall be 
delivered, not to the buyer himself, but to a third party 
nominated by the buyer. In the absence of any such agree-
ment, express or implied, the seller sufficiently performs 
his duty to deliver by making the goods available to the 
buyer in a deliverable state at the place and time designa-
ted in the contract of sale so as to enable the buyer to 
obtain custody of or control over the goods. 
In Duni Chand Ratarria V. Bhuwalka Brothers}^ the 
question before the Supreme Court was. Whether the settle-
ment contract mentioned could be called contracts between 
the appellant and the respondent involving the actual 
delivery of possession of the goods. The facts of the 
instant case were as follows : The appellant entered into 
(2) Benjamin's. Sale of Goods. 586 (ll'^ Ed.,1981). 
(3) A.I.R. 1955, S.C. 182. 
(4) Id. at 185. 
three contracts with the respondent some bags of '3' 
twills at different prices. The respondent expressed 
its inability to deliver the goods under the said contracts 
and requested the appellant to settle the same by selling 
back the goods under the said contract to the respondent 
at the price of En. 161-S-O per 100 bags. The appellant 
duly submitted to the respondent his bills for the amounts 
due to at the foot of the said contracts aggregating to 
Rs. 1,15,650/- v;hich the respondent accepted but failed and 
neglected to pay in spite of repeated demand of the 
appellant. 
The Supreme Court held that settlement contract 
mentioned above could be called contracts between the 
appellant and the respondent involving the actual delivery 
of possession of the goods. 
In J.V. Gokal & Co.(Pvt.) Ltd. V. The Assistant 
Collector Sales Tax (Inspection) & Others,^ the Supreme 
Court through Subba Rao.J. held that the delivery of the 
bill of lading while the goods are afloat is equivalent 
to the delivery of the goods themselves. 
In The Union of India, V. The West Punjab 
Factories, Ltd.,^ in the instant case the delivery book 
(5) A.I.R. 1960, S.C. 595. 
(6) A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 395. 
had been signed and the railway receipts had been 
delivered to the railway? but the evidence was that it 
was the practice at the particular railway station, so 
far as the J.C. Mills was concerned, to sign the delivery 
book and hand over the railway receipts and give credit 
vouchers in respect of the freight of the consignment even 
before the goods had been unloaded from wagons^ The 
evidence also established that even after taken delivery 
had been made in the manner indicated above, the consignee 
was not authorised to remove the goods from the v;agons 
and that it was the railway which unloaded the wagons and 
it was thereafter that the Consignee was permitted to 
remove such goods with the permission of the Assistant 
Goods Clerk."^  
It was held that thc^ ugh there was a token delivery, 
there was no real delivery by the railway to the consignee.® 
In brief we can say that the delivery of goods 
may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall 
be taken as delivery. 
Thus delivery may be either actual or symbolic 
or constructive. A symbolic delivery takes place where, 
(7) Id. at 399 - 400. 
(8) Ibid. 
for example, sale of specific goods which are locked up 
in a godown. The seller gives the key of the godcwn to 
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the buyer in order that he may get the goods. In a 
constructive delivery a seller in possession of the thing 
sold assent, to hold it solely on the buyer's account, 
there may be constixictive delivery of this kind where the 
seller continues to hold as a bailee for a reward or as a 
gratuitious borrower.' 
(II). INSTALMENT DELIVERIES :-
Sec. 38 of the Sale of Goods Act deals with 
instalment deliveries : 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is 
not bound to accept delivery thereof by ir-stalments 
(2) yjhere there is a contract for the Sale of Goods to 
be delivered by stated instalments which sre to be 
seperately paid for, and the seller makes no 
delivery or defective delivery in respect of one 
or more instalments, or the buyer neglects or 
(9) Example 3 of Sec.33 of Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
(10) Sale of a horse. The seller than ask the buyer to 
lend him the horse for a short time. The buyer assents 
and leaves the horse in the custody of the seller. 
The horse has been delivered to the buyer. 
Example 2 of Sec.33 of the Act, 1930. 
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refuse to take delivery of or pay for one or 
more instalments, it is a question in each case 
depending on the terms of the contract and the 
circumstances of the case, whether the breach of 
contract is a repudiation of the whole contract, 
or whether it is a severable breach giving rise 
to a claim for compensation, but not to a right 
to treat the whole contract as repudiated. 
The meaning of Sec.38(1 ) is that instalment 
deliveries can be made or demanded only if the contract 
so provides. The contract to make instalment deliveries 
may be either express or implied. 
In Union of India, V. K.H. Rao,^ '' the plaintiff 
had agreed to supply onions to the military authority at 
their depot in Bangilore and at three other places according 
to a schedule of the agreement which empowered the officer 
sanctioning the contract to rescind the contract by 
written notice to the plaintiff and forfeit the security 
deposit of Rs. 4300/- under certain circumstances. The 
plaintiff defaulted to supply onions to the Bangalore 
depot after a certain date of agreement. After some corres-
pondence, the officer rescind the contract and forfeited 
the security deposit of Rs. 4300/-. 
(11) A.I.R. 1976, S.C. 626. 
s 
In the Supreme Court, t he counsel on behalf of 
the p l a in t i f f respondent, t r i e d to r a i s e a plea based on 
Sec. 38(2) of the Sale of Goods Act. The argument i s 
t h a t under the con t rac t , t he onions were to be supplied 
i n monthly ins ta lments and when the p l a i n t i f f fa i led to 
d e l i v e r the instalment from 17-11-1949 onwards, i t did 
not amount to a repudia t ion of the e n t i r e contract making 
the p l a in t i f f l i a b l e for damages, i f any, incurred by the 
defendant a f t e r November 17, 1949 i n making r i sk purchases 
from the market. This plea can not be en ter ta ined at t h i s 
s t a g e . I t was not setup i n the p l a i n t , no issue '.vas 
framed as t h i s point nor was i t a g i t a t e d before the court 
below. 
The Supreme court pointed out t h a t under Sec.38(2) 
of the Sale of Goods Act, the ques t ion on whether in case 
of defaul t of supply, the o ther con t rac t for instalment 
d e l i v e r i e s stands repudiated or not depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case . 
Supreme Court fur ther sa id through Sarkaria J : 
"We therefore do not permit the p l a i n t i f f to 
ra i se t h i s plea for the f i r s t time now, in t h i s 
cour t" . ""^  
(12) Id. a t 630. 
In short, if the failure of the performance of 
a part of the contract goes to the root of the contract, 
it may be considered to be a breach of the whole of it, 
but if the contract is severable one and the failure to 
perform a part of it is not going to affect the performance 
of the remaining one, then it should be considered to be 
a breach only in respect of that part. 
(Ill)- DELIVERY TO CARRIER OR '»VHARFINGER :-
Sec. 39 of Sale of Goods Act provides : 
(1) V/here, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the 
seller is authorised or required to send the goods 
to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, 
whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose 
of transmission to the buyer, or delivery of the 
goods to a wharfinger for safe custody, is prima-
facie deemed to be a delivery. 
It means, that, a purchaser orders goods to be 
sent by a carrier, though he does not name any particular 
carrier to the seller of the goods, the moment the goods 
are delivered to the carrier it operates as a delivery 
to purchaser. 
(2) Unless otherwise authorised by the buyer, the 
seller shall make such contract with the carrier 
or v/harfinger on behalf of the buyer as may be 
reasonable having regard to the nature of the 
goods and the other circumstances of the case. 
If the seller omits so to do, and the goods are , 
lost or damaged in course of transit or whilist 
in the custody of the wharfinger, the buyer may 
decline to treat the delivery to the carrier or 
wharfinger as a delivery to himself, or may hold 
the seller responsible in damages. 
In other words this sub-section applies the buyer 
can either reject the goods, or accept them and claim 
damages. It may be observed that this section is not so 
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carefully drafted as the proviso to Sec. 26 v;hich is 
in certain respect parellel to this provision. 
Sub Section 3 of Section 39 runs as follows :-
Unless otherv;ise agreed, where goods are sent by 
the seller to the buyer by a route involving sea transit. 
(13) Provided that, where delivery has been delayed 
through the fault of either buyer or seller, the 
goods are at the risk of the party in fault as 
regards any loss which might not have occured but 
for such fault : 
Provided also that nothing in this Sec shall 
affect the duties or liabilities of either seller or 
buyer as a bailee of the goods of the other party. 
9a 
in circumstances in which it is usual to insure, the 
seller shall give such notice to the buyer as may enable 
him to insure them during their sea transit, and if the 
seller fails so to do, the goods shall be deemed to be 
at his risk during such sea transit. 
In Bajarang Jute Mills Ltd. V. State of A.R.,^^ 
the appellant mill manufacturing jute goods at Guntur 
in the State of A.P. had entered into a contract for 
supplying jute bags to a cement company having cement 
factories in several states in India (including one at 
Tadepalle in the State of Andhra) for the purpose of 
marketing its products. The terms of the contract 
provided that after the despatch instructions calling 
upon the appellant to send jute bags by railway to the 
cement factories of the cement company outside the State 
of Andhra 'were receded. The appellant was to load the 
goods in the railway wagons, obtain railway receipts in 
the name of the cement company as consignee against 
payment of price and after delivering the railway receipt, 
to the factory at Tadepalle, which was far the purpose 
of receiving the railway receipts and making payment, 
the agent of the cement company, received payments for 
the goods so despatched at Tadepalle. The contention 
(14) A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 376. 
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v;as - as the railway receipts were delivered to the 
agent of the buyer within the State of Andhra, the goods 
must be deemed to have been delivered to the buyer within 
the State of Andhra and the appellant was liable to pay 
sales tax on the price of goods sold. 
The Supreme court held that as the goods were not 
actually delivered in the State of Andhra, it could not 
be inffered from the fact that the property had passed 
within the State of Andhra. 
(IV). THE C.I.F. CONTRACT :-
This contract is a contract for the Sale of goods 
at a price which covers cost, insurance and freight, and 
is normally a contract for sale of goods to be carried 
by sea. 
15 It is observed in chalmer's Sale of Goods that 
a ci.f. contract is a contract "for the sale of insured 
goods, lost or not lost". 
According to Benjamin^^: A ci.f. contract is an 
agreement to sell goods at an inclusive price covering 
the cost of the goods, insurance and freight. The 
essential feature of such a contract is that a seller, 
(15) Chalmer's, Sale of Goods, 112-113 (I3"th Ed. 1957) 
(16) Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 855 (IIi^«i Ed. 1981) 
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having shipped or bought afloat, goods in accordance 
with the contract, fulfils his part of the bargain by-
tendering to the buyer the proper shipping documents; 
if he does this, he is not in breach even though the 
goods have been lost before such tender. In the event 
of such loss the buyer must nevertheless pay the price 
on tender of the documents and his remedies, if any, 
villi be against the carrier or against the under v;riter 
but not against the seller on the contract of sale. 
In Mahabir Commercial Co. Ltd. V. The Commissioner 
of Income Tax, W.B., ^ ' the Supreme Court pointed out 
the incident of a c.i.f. contract:^^ 
In a ci.f. contract the seller has first to 
ship at the port of shipment goods of the 
description contained in the contract. He must 
then procure the shipping documents (contract 
of affreightment) as contemplated by the contract 
upon the terms current covering the whole transit 
of the goods. He must arrange for an insurance 
of an amount equal to their reasonable value of 
shipment upon the terms current in the trade 
which will be available and it should be for the 
(17) A.I.R. 1973, S.C. 430. 
(18) Id. at 437 - 438. 
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benefit of the buyer. He must also make an 
invoice which is a written account of the parti-
culars of goods delivered to the buyer with value 
of the goods of their price and charges ect. 
annexed. This invoice is made out debiting the 
buyer with the agreed price and giving him credit 
for the amount of freight which he vdll pay the 
ship owner on actual deliver/. And lastly the 
shipper should tender the shipping documents to 
enable the buyer to deal with the goods in the 
usual way of business. He is also required to 
tender such other documents as are specified in 
the contract and if the contract is silent it is 
sufficient if the seller tenders the bill of 
lading, policy of insurance and invoice. All 
these documents must be valid on tender. Under 
the ci.f. contract primafacie the propeity in the 
goods passes once the goods are tendered by the 
seller to the buyer or his agent as required under 
the contract. But v;here the seller retains control 
over the goods by either obtaining a bill of 
lading in his name or to his order, the property 
in the goods does not pass to the buyer until he 
endorses the bill to the buyer and delivers the 
documents to him. 
I Q o 
At, l a s t , c i . f . contract i s an agreement to s e l l 
goods a t an i nc lus ive pr ice covering the cost of good, 
insurance and f r e i g h t . 
(V). F.O.R. CONTACTS :-
f.o.r. means free on rail. Benjamin said : 
An f*o.r. contract is a contract by which the seller 
undertakes at his expense to put the goods into the 
possession of a rail carrier (or, if the contract is on 
so called f.o.r. terms, to bear the expense of loading 
them on the railway truck), usually at a named place of 
departure, for transmission to the buyer. 
Under a free on rail contract (f.o.r.) the seller 
under takes to deliver the goods into railway wagons or 
at the station, (depending on the practice of the railway 
at his own expense, and (commonly) to make such contract 
with the railway on behalf of the buyer as is reasonable, 
in the circumstances. Primafacie the time of delivery 
f.o.r. fixes the point at v;hich property and risk pass 
to the buyer and price becomes payable.'^^ 
In M/S Marwar Tent Factory V. Union of India 
and Others,^^ the Supreme Court cited^^ the case of 
(19) Benjamin's Sale of Goods. 1932 (II^^Ed., 1981). 
(20) Halsbury's Law of England, 800 (iV'^ ^^ Ed., V.4l). 
(21) A.I.R. 1990, S.C. 1753. 
(22) Id. at 1757. 
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Girlja Proshad Pal V« National Coal Co. Ltd., ^ in 
the instant case the question as to meaning df f.o.r. 
contract fell for consideration, P.B. Mukharji, J. as 
his lordship then was observed in as follows '• 
"The words f.o.r. are well known words in 
commercial contracts. In my judgement they 
mean when used to qualify the place of delivery, 
that the seller's liability is to place the 
goods free on the rail as the place of delivery. 
Once that is done the risk belongs to the 
buyer."^^ 
In brief, we can say that f.o.r. means, when 
the contract is on so called f.o.r. terms the liability 
of seller is to place the goods free on rail. 
***** 
*** 
* 
(23) A.I.R. 1949, Cal. 472. 
(24) Supra note - 21 at 1757, 
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C H A P T E R - VI 
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT 
(I). THE REMEDIES OF THE SELLER :-
A seller who has not been paid for the goods is 
naturally concerned to ensure that he does receive payment. 
In the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the personal remedies 
are given to the seller, which are concern with the breach 
of contract by the buyer. The seller has of course, his 
personal action upon the sale for breach of contract by 
the buyer. The seller's claim to the agreed price and 
to damages for breach of contract by the buyer are remedies 
This action may take one of two forms. It may be an 
action for the price of goods sold, or it may be an action 
for damages for non-acceptance. 
. Section 54 of the Sale of Goods Act provides : 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a 
contract of sale is not rescinded by the mere 
exercise by an unpaid seller of his right of 
lien or stoppage in transit. 
(2) Where the goods are of a perishable nature, or 
lOo 
where the unpaid seller who has exercised his 
right of lien or stoppage in transit gives notice 
to the buyer of his intention to re-sell, the 
unpaid seller may, if the buyer does not within 
a reasonable time pay or tender the price, re-
sells the goods within a reasonable time and 
recover from the original buyer damages for any 
loss occassioned by his breach of contract, but 
the buyer shall not be entitled to any profit 
which may occur on the resale* If such notice 
is not given, the unpaid seller shall not be 
entitled to recover such damages and the buyer 
shall be entitled to the profit, if any, on the 
re-sale. 
(3) Where an unpaid seller, who has exercised his 
right of lien or stoppage in transit re-sells 
the goods, the buyer acquires a good title thereto 
as against the original buyer not with standing 
that no notice of the re-sale has been given to 
the original buyer. 
(4) Where the seller expressly reserves a right of 
re-sale in case the buyer should make default, 
and, on the buyer making default, re-sells the 
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goods, the original contract of sale is thereby 
rescinded, but without prejudice to any claim 
which the seller may have for damages. 
(i) Unpaid Seller's Right Of Re-Sale : 
Now the mere fact, that the buyer has failed 
to pay, or is insolvent, and the goods have been stopped 
in transit does not entitle the seller to rescind the 
contract. The unpaid seller, though in possession of 
the goods, has not the right merely because he is unpaid 
to resume a complete right of property. So as to divest 
totally the buyer's right of property in the goods. Still 
less has he the right to do so by re-taking them out of 
the buyer's possession after delivery. This is an 
actionable trespass and the buyer can recover the full 
value of the goods as damages, though it does not preclude 
the seller from sueing.or counter claiming for the 
price, for the tort of the seller does not rescind the 
contract. 
Sub section (2) of see 54 of Sale of Goods Act, 
1930 is based on sub section (3) of Section 48 of the 
English Sale of Goods Act, 1893. The English Act does 
not specifically deal with the case when notice is not 
(1) Pollock & Mulla, Indian Sale of Goods Act, 278. 
(1977). 
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given by the unpaid seller to the buyer. The Indian Act 
on another hand, definitely declares that if notice is 
not given, the unpaid seller is not entitled to recover 
damages or any loss Qccassioned by the breach of contract, 
and the buyer is entitled to the profit, if any, on the 
re-sale. 
Now the problem is whether the right of unpaid 
seller is a mere right to retain possession until he is 
paid or something more, that is to say, a right to 
interfere not only with the buyer's right of possession 
but also with his right of property in goods. Lord 
Black burn expressed the opinion : 
"Viewing it is a practical question, the most 
convenient doctrine would be to consider the 
vendor as entitled in all cases to hold the goods 
as a security for the price, with a power of 
re-sale to be exercised, in case the delay of 
payment was unreasonably long, in such a manner 
as might be fair and reasonable under all the 
circumstances. If the re-sale was conducted by 
the vendor in a fair and reasonable manner, the 
original, purchaser who was in default would 
have no right to complain ; If the re-sale 
IDiJ 
produced a sum greater then the urpaid portion 
of the price, the purchaser would be entitled 
to the surplus; if there was a deficiency, he 
would still remain indebted to the vendor for 
that amount". 
In P.S.N.S* Ambalavana Chettiar and Co« Ltd. and another, 
\^ . Express News papers Ltd» Bombay, the Supreme court 
has said : 
"The Statutory power of re-sale under Sec. 54 
(2) arises if the property in the goods has 
passed to the buyer subject to the lien of the 
unpaid seller. Where the property in the goods 
has not passed to the buyer, the seller has no 
right of re-rsale under Sec. 54(2)"."^ 
In the instant case the Supreme Court held that 
for the purpose of measure of damages under the Sale of 
Goods Act the re-sale is properly made if the property 
in the goods re-sold had passed to the original buyer. 
In this particular case there was an agreement 
to sell the whole stock of 415 tons on news print lying 
with the seller on Nov. 13, 1951. Subsequently, i.e. 
(2) Black burn on Sale, 482 (3^ Ed.) 
(3) A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 741. 
(4) Id. at 743. 
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on Nov.26, 1951 the cont rac t was var ied , and i t was 
agreed t h a t out of t h a t stock only 300 tons would be 
suppl ied on March 29, 1952 the buyer refuse to take 
goods. The s e l l e r sought t o recover by way of damages 
the d i f ferece between the cont rac t pr ice and the r e -
s a l e p r i ce of goods. I t was held t h a t in the in s t an t 
case the contract was for the sa le of unascertained 
goods and, the re fo re , the proper ty in such goods did 
not pass u n t i l the goods have been ascer ta ined. So 
t h e s e l l e r did not have a r i g h t t o r e - sa l e u / s 54(2) . 
According to Sec.54(2) t h e ' s e l l e r may s e l l 
pe r i shab le goods, within a reasonable time, the Sale 
of Goods Act, 1930 follows the English Act 1893, and 
by enacting t h a t he may i n any case r e - s e l l a f t e r 
reasonable no t i ce . The Supreme Court in U/S Dhanraj mal 
Gobindram, V. M/S.Shamji Kalidas & Co.^ held : 
" tha t the r i g h t of r e - s a l e given by Sec.54(2) 
and (4) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act i s 
exercised by the s e l l e r for himself and not 
as an agent of the buyer, when the l a t t e r i s 
given a not ice of s a l e . This i s indeed c l ea r 
from the fac t t h a t t he buyer i s not e n t i t l e d 
t o the p r o f i t on r e - s a l e in tha t contingency, 
(5) A.I.R. 1961, S.C. 1285. 
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though liable for damages the position is 
different when no notice is so sent. Then the 
profits go to the buyer". 
It is clear that there is no specific provision 
in the Sale of Goods Act disallowing re-sale if the 
property in the goods has not passed to the original 
buyer. 
(ii) Suit for Price :-
It is the duty of a buyer to pay the price in 
accordance with the contract. A part from exercising 
rights against the goods, if the buyer does not pay for 
them, seller may sue the buyer to recover the price. 
The Seller's action for the price, although not right 
in rem akin to his lien or right of stoppage, has some-
thing in common with those rights, namely that it is 
available only to unpaid seller. As Section 55(1) 
Provides : 
"where, under a contract of sale, the property 
in the goods has passed to the buyer and the 
buyer wrongfully neglects or refuse to pay for 
the goods according to terms of the contract, 
the seller may sue him for the price of the goods." 
(6) Id. at 1290. 
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The other hallmark of this right of action is 
that it is almost exclusively dependent upon the property 
having passed to the buyer. It is the fact that property 
has passed upon which, subject to any term express or 
implied in the contract as to the time of payment, the 
action is based. By Section 56 of the Sale of Goods 
Act, 1930 : 
"where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses 
to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may 
maintain an action against him for damages for 
non- acceptance. 
According to Sec. 55(1) and 56 seller has -
(i) An action for price where the property has passed 
and the buyer has accepted the goods. 
(ii) An action for damages where the property has not 
passed and the buyer refuses to accept the goods. 
(iii) An action for the price, or of damages where the 
property has passed and the buyer refuses to 
accept the goods. 
These provisions are for the safe guard of the 
seller, when property in the goods has passed to the buyer 
llo 
from seller, but there is one exceptional case in which 
the seller may sue for the price although the property 
has not passed, for under Section 55(2) :-
Where under a contract of sale the price is 
payable on a day certain irrespective of 
delivery and the buyer wrongfully neglects or 
refuses to pay such price, the seller may sue 
him for the price although the property in 
the goods has not passed and the goods have 
not been appropriated to the contract. 
In Bungo Steel Furniture, V« Union of India, 
the Supreme Court considered the question of damages 
for breach of contract. In this case the government 
wrongfully cancelled the contract to purchase the balance 
of 2,528 bins from the Bungo Steel Company. At the 
date of cancellation these bins had not been completely 
manufactured. The sole question for determination 
related to the remedy of the manufacturer of bins under 
the law of Sale of goods. 
The Supreme Court quoted Sections 55 and 56 
of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and found that Section 55 
which deals with suit fcrr price on breach of contract, 
(7) A.I.R. 1967, S.C. 378. 
IVt 
was incappable because the goods had not been f inished 
and the property in the goods had passed to the government 
S e c t i o n 56 deal ing with damages fo r non-acceptance, 
however, appl ied . The Supreme Court through Rama Swami.J. 
o 
laid down the principles for ascertainment of damages : 
The normal rule for computing the damages for . 
non-acceptance of 2,582 unfinished bins would be 
the difference between the contract price and the 
market price of such goods at the time when contract 
is broken. If there is no available market at the 
place of delivery, the market price of nearest 
place or the price prevailing in the controlling 
market may be taken into consideration. 
Further said; although the bins are not comple-
tely fabricated, but, in that case the measure of 
damages would be the differece between the contract 
price on the one hand, and the cost of labour and 
material required for the manufacture of the comp-
onent parts of the 2,528 unfinished bins on the 
o 
other. 
The result is that if the passing of the property 
depands upon the fulfilment of some condition and that 
(8) Id. at 381. 
(9) Ibid. 
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condition is not fulfilled, the seller can not sue for 
the price, even if the non-fulfilment of the condition 
is due to the default of the buyer; he can bring an 
action for damages for non-acceptance under section 56 
of Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
(II). THE BUYER'S REMEDY IN DAMAGES :-
The buyer will have a remedy in damages, where 
the seller is in breach of some term of the contract. 
At the time, while negotiating a contract the parties 
make certain statements regarding the goods which are 
the subject matter of the contract. Some of these asser-
tions or statements are an integral part of the contract. 
The test in each case is whether the parties intended 
that a particular stipulation shall have a binding effect. 
If the statement was not intended to be of that character, 
it will not be an essential element of the contract and 
thus no right of action will arise. It often happens that 
the seller does not make express stipulations with regard 
to quality, fitness or other components of the subject 
matter of the contract, yet the law implies certain terms 
as inseparable from the contract on the basis of the 
presumed intention of the parties or a custom or usage. 
Ho 
In either case these assertions, statements or inferences 
imputed by the law constitute conditions and warranties. 
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY : 
Warranty is a civil obligation says prof. 
Llewellyn. 'Its purpose, like that of any civil obligation, 
is atonce to police, to prevent and to remedy'.^ 
Warranty, as it is understood in English Law means, 
"almost the whole range and scope of the seller's duty 
with regard to the quality of the goods".^^ 
A 'warranty' is a stipulation collateral to the 
main purposes of the contract, the breach of which gives 
rise to a claim for damages but not to a right to reject 
the goods and treat the contract as repudiated.^ Which 
means that the buyer is not, by reason of a breach of 
warranty, entitled to reject the goods; he may"set up 
against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution 
or extinction of the price".''^ 
Sec. 59 of the Act says about the remedies for 
breach of warranty :-
(10) Llewellyn, K.N. "On warranty of Quality and Society" 
36 Colum. L.Rev. 699, 712 (1936). 
(11) Samuel.J. Stoljar, "Condition, warranties and Descri-
ption of Quality in Sale of Goods- I", 
15 Mod. L.Rev. 425 (1952). 
(12) Sec. 12(3) of Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 
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(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the 
seller, or where the buyer elects or is comp-
elled to treat any breach of a condition on 
the part of the seller as a breach of warranty, 
the buyer is not by reason only of such breach 
of warranty entitled to reject the goods? but 
he may s 
(a) Set-up against the seller the breach of 
warranty in diminution or extinction of 
the price; or 
(b) Sue the seller for damages for breach of 
warranty. 
(2) The fact that a buyer has setup a breach of 
warranty in diminution or extinction of the 
price does not prevent him for suing for the 
same breach of warranty if he has suffered 
further damage. 
"A breach of warranty does not entitle the 
buyer to reject the goods and his only remedies would 
be those provided in Sec. 59 of the Sale of Goods Act, 
1930, namely, to set up against the seller the breach 
of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price or 
lie. 
14 to sue the seller for damages for breach of warranty". 
In Union of India V. A.L. Rallia Ram,^^ the 
respondent had purchased and taken delivery of a certain 
number of packets of cigarettes from the Government of 
India under a contract which provided that, "All sales 
vdll be conducted on the distinct understanding that the 
goods sold are on a 'Said to Contain' basis. No respon-
sibility for quality will be accepted whatsoever after 
the delivery is made at the depot", but on inspection 
(respon.) he found that some cigarettes were mild wed 
and unfit for use. Out of the packets delivered the 
respondent sold some of them in the market at a price 
lower than the purchase price and returned the rest under 
an arrangement whereby the Government was to take back 
the goods found v/ith the respondent in their original 
packing. The contract with regard to undelivered goods 
was cancelled. The question before the Supreme Court was 
v/hether the Government v;ere liable to pay compensation 
in respect of goods delivered to respondent under the 
contract. 
The Supreme Court held that the respondent was 
entitled to claim compensation for breach of contract 
(14) Gopal Krishna Pillai, V.K..M. Mani, A.I.R. 1984, 
S.C. 216 at 220. 
(15) A.I.R. 1963, S.C. 1685. 
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on the ground that the Government of India had conimitted 
a breach of warranty. The measure of damages in the 
instant case being the price paid and the price relised 
on sale. 
In the instant case the respondent also claimed 
for incidental charges on account if expenses incurred 
on advertisement, storage agency commission etc. The 
Supreme Court did not accept the contention of the 
respondent. It is true to say that when the delivery of the 
goods was taken by respondent than respondent became 
owner of the goods by the express intendment of the contract 
The expenses incurred on advertisement, storage agency 
commission since the respondent took delivery was therefore 
in respect of his own goods and he could not claim these 
expenses as part of compensation payable for breach of 
warranty in respect of goods retained by him. 
In Gopal Krishna Eillai, V. K.M. Manj,^*^ the 
appellant's case was that the respondent sold a cow and 
a calf to him for Rs. 1,600/- but it did not yield the 
quantity of milk which the respondent had stated, it would 
yield. It was also suffering from an incurable disease , 
which was concealed by the respondent. Having been 
apprised of the position, the respondent agreed to buy 
(16) A.I.R. 1984, S.C. 216. 
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the said cow and the calf back for same price which had 
been paid by the appellant to him. On the amount of 
having not been paid after the delivery of the animals, 
the appellant filed a suit for recovery of the price of 
the animals and interest thereon. 
In the instant case it was a condition of contract 
that the cow yield a quantity of milk and such condition' 
not having fullfilled, he was entitled to reject the 
goods, namely, the cow and the calf and get a refund of 
the price. In the said case, the Supreme court found 
that it was not the case of breach of warranty but it was 
only for re-sale by the buyer to the seller at the sale 
price being very same amount which the buyer had paid to 
the seller. 
Since the buyer is entitled to setup against 
the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or 
extinction of the price, the amount, if any, which the 
buyer is ultimately to pay to the seller will depend 
upon the difference between the amount of price payable 
and the amount of damages recoverable for the breach of 
warranty. 
In brief, in the case of breach of warranty 
Sec. 59 prescribes the remedy. The buyer has following 
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remedies in case of breach of warranty '— 
(1) he may refuse to the price altogether if loss 
exceeds or equals the price. 
(2) he may claim deduction in the price if loss 
occasioned is less than the price. 
(3) he may pay the price, and claim damages from 
the seller for breach of warranty and loss 
occasioned by him. 
(III). INTEREST BY WAY OF DAMAGES & SPECIAL DAMAGES : 
In addition to the seller's right or buyer's right 
to sue for the price, or for damages for non-acceptance, 
he (Buyer or Seller) may also have the right to claim 
special damages under Section 61, which runs as follows : 
(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the 
seller or the buyer to recover interest or special 
damages in any case where by law interest or spe-
cial damages may be recoverable, or to recover the 
money paid where the consideration for the payment 
of^ _has failed. 
(2) In the absence of a contract to the contrary, 
the court may award interest at such rate as 
it thinks fit on the amount of the prices-
12-
(a) to the seller in a suit by him for the amount 
of the price - from the date of the tender of 
the goods or from the date on which the price 
was payable. 
(b) to the buyer in a suit by him for the refund 
of the price in a case of breach of the contract 
on the part of the seller - from the date on 
which the payment was made. 
"Sec. 61 of the Sale of Goods Act provides for 
interest by way of damages and special damages, where the 
goods are resold by the buyer to the original seller, 
the money consideration for such resale is the price of 
the goods and such buyer would be entitled to claim 
interest by way of damages under sub-section 2(a)". 
In Union of India, V. Rallia Ram, ' the respon-
dent claimed before the umpire (and that claim was upheld) 
that he had to borrow from his bankers a large amount of 
money for meeting his obligation under the contract with 
the Govt, and he was entitled to recover from the 
Dominion of India interest paid by him to his bankers, 
for the period during which his money remained with the 
(17) Ibid. 
(18) Supra note - 15. 
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Dominion of India. The umpire awarded the interest to 
the respondent but the Supreme Court through Shah.J. saids 
We know of no principle on which the Government 
of India could be rendered liable for payment 
of interest in the circumstances relied upon. 
In respect of that part of the contract which 
was abandoned, if any liability to pay interest 
had arisen it was for the respondent to claim 
it in setting the terms on which cancellation 
of the contract was to be made. In respect of 
the goods which had not been returned by him, 
he could claim compensation for breach of 
warranty, but such compensation could not include 
interest as damages for detention of money. 
Interest was therefore allowed on a view of the 
law which appeared on the face of the award to 
be erroneous.20 
The buyer can only recover interest when he is 
entitled to recover the purchase price, that is to say, 
when he can sue for the price prepaid as money had and 
received by reason of total failure for consideration. 
He cannot recover interest when his only remedy is to sue 
(19) Id. at 1694. 
(20) Id. at 1695. 
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for damages, for instance, for a breach of warranty, 
even though those damages may be sufficient to extinguish 
the price. 
In Gopal Krishna Pillai, V. K.M- Mani,^^ the 
issue of interest, was undoubtedly not made the subject 
matter of agreement between the appellant and the respon-
dent, but the same was claimed by the appellant by way of 
damages. 
Sub Section 2 of 61 provides that in the absence 
of a contract to the contrary, the court may award 
interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of 
the price - to the seller in a suit by him for the amount 
of the price - from the date of tender of goods or from 
the date on which the price was payable. The Supreme 
Court held that "under the provisions of Sec. 61(2) of the 
Sale of Goods Act, the appellant was clearly entitled to 
such interest by way of damages".^^ 
In ^ VS Marwar Tent Factory, V. Union of India,^ '^  
the appellant firm entered into a contract for supply of 
tents to Director General of Supplies & Disposal. The 
term of delivery under the contract was "F.O.R." place 
of despatch. It was further agreed between the parties 
(21) Supra note - 16. 
(22) Id. at 221. 
(23) A.I.R. 1990, S.C. 1753. 
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t h a t 9b% of the p r i ce was payable on proof of despatch 
and production of inspection note . The balance b% was 
t o be paid a f t e r r ece ip t of the goods in good condit ion 
by the consignee. One consignment of 1500 t e n t s was 
despatched to the consignee by the firm under railway 
r e c e i p t . The consignee reported t h a t 224 t e n t s out of 
s a l e consignment had not been received at de s t i na t i on 
and consequently a sum of represent ing full p r i ce of 
t hose 224 t en t s inc lus ive of sa les tax was deducted from 
t h e amount due t o the firm under another con t rac t . The 
firm said t ha t the property in the goods immediately 
passed t o the consignee, when the t e n t s were despatched 
under railway r e c e i p t . 
Now, before the Supreme cour t the quest ion was 
whether the appe l lan ts were e n t i t l e d to take i n t e r e s t on 
unpaid p r i ce of 224 t en t s amounting to Rs. 51 .912/- for 
t h e period from 1-1-1969 to 1-12-1972 @ 12% per annum. 
The Supreme Court through Ray. J . held J 
"We have already held hereinbefore t h a t the 
appel lan t i s en t i t l ed to ge t not only the pr ice 
of the goods but also the i n t e r e s t thereon for 
not making the payment of the pr ice of the goods 
within a reasonable time".^*^ 
(24) Id . a t 1758. 
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and further held : 
"On a conspectus of provisions of Sec 61(2) 
of the Sale of Goods Act, we are constrained to 
hold that the plaintiff is entitled to get a 
decree of interest on the unpaid price from 
1-1-1969 to 1-12-1971 @ t% per annum which is 
considered to be a reasonable rate of interest, 
as claimed by the plaintiff- appellant". ^ 
In the instant case, undoubtedly the court has 
found that the property in the goods passed at the time, 
when the goods were despatched under railway receipt and 
according to Sec. 61(2)-court ordered to pay the interest. 
It can summarised as follows; in such a case the 
buyer is bound to pay the price when the goods are deli-
vered to him. If the buyer does not pay the price in 
time and wrongfully delays the payment of the same the 
court may award interest on price at such rate as it 
thinks fit on the amount of the price from the date when 
the price was payable. Thus the court may order interest 
on the price from the date of tender of goods if no date 
for the payment of the price has been decided or from 
the date on which the price was payable.^^ 
***** 
*** 
* 
(25) Id. at 1759. 
(26) R.K. Bangia, Sale of Goods, 139 (Ilird Ed.,1985). 
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C H A P T E R - VII 
AUCTION SALE : -
"An auct ion i s a manner of s e l l i ng property by 
b ids usual ly to the highest bidder by public competetion. 
But i t i s open to the p a r t i e s to en ter in to spec ia l 
s t i p u l a t i o n s varying the ordinary r i g h t s and obl iga t ions 
so long as such s t i p u l a t i o n s are not i l l e g a l . Thus, 
though, under t h i s sec t ion 64, c e r t a i n impl icat ions may 
a r i s e upon an auct ion sa le being held, i t i s poss ib le 
fo r the p a r t i e s by spec ia l agreement to vary some of the 
r i g h t s and ob l iga t ions a r i s ing from such s a l e " . 
In Halsbury 's Laws of England"!, Bidding the 
method of bidding and the amount of the bids are usual ly 
regu la ted by the condit ions of S a l e ( l ) . Unt i l the property 
i s a c tua l l y knocked down there i s no complete contrac t 
of s a l e . A bid i s mere a offer and can be r e t r a c t e d by 
t h e bidder a t any time before the auct ioneer announces 
the completion of s a l e by the f a l l of hammer, or i n 
o t h e r customary manner. 
Sec. 64 of the Sale of Goods Act dea l t s with in 
(1) Halsbury's Laws of England, 380 (4"^^ Ed., V. 2) 
n^ 
the case of a sale by auction : 
(i) Where goods are put up for sale in lots, each 
lot is prima facie deemed to be the subject 
of a separate contract of sale? 
(ii) The sale is complete when the auctioneer 
announces its completion by the fall of the 
hammer or in other customary manner* and, until 
such announcement is made, any bidder may 
retract his bid; 
(iii) A right to bid may be reserved expressly by or 
on behalf of the seller and, where such right 
is expressly so reserved, but not otherwise, 
the seller or any one person on his behalf may, 
subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, 
bid at the auction. 
(iv) Where the sale is not notified to be subject to 
a right to bid on behalf of the seller, it shall 
not be lawful for the seller to bid himself or 
to em.ploy any person to bid at such sale, or 
for the auctioneer knowingly to take any bid 
from the seller or any such person; and any sale 
contravening this rule may be treated as frau-
dulent by the buyer; 
1'^ ^ 
(v) The sa le may be not i f ied to be subject to a reser-
ved or upset p r i ce . 
( v i ) If the s e l l e r makes use of pretended bidding to 
r a i s e the p r i ce , the sa le i s voidable a t the 
opt ion of the buyer. 
SCOPE OF THE SECTION : 
Sec. 64 of the Sale of Goods Act i s mainly based 
upon Sec. 58 of the English Act, though i t i s somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t l y arranged. In >yS. Chowringhee Sales Bureau 
Pv t . Ltd. V. C I . T . West Bengal,^ i t was held t h a t i t 
only (Sec.64) deals vath the r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s of 
t he p a r t i e s to the contract of s a l e . 
In Consolidated Coffee Ltd. V. Coffee Board Bangalore,'^ ^j^e 
Supreme Court found that*^ " there i s i n t r i n s i c mater ia l 
i n Sec. 64 i t s e l f which shows t h a t the provis ions there 
of could be subject to a contract t o the contrary . More-
over , once i t i s accepted tha t auct ion sa les to which 
Sec. 64, app l i e s , could be uncondi t ional or condi t ional 
and t h a t the auct ioneer can p resc r ibe his own terms and 
condi t ions on the basis of which the property i s exposed 
(2) A.I.R. 1973, S.C. 376. 
(3) A.I.R. 1980, S.C. 1468. 
(4) Id. at 1493. 
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to sale by auction it must be held that the acceptance 
of any bid as well as the passing of property in the 
goods sold there at would be governed by those terms and 
conditions". 
The sale becomes complete when the auctioneer 
announces the acceptance of the bid by the fall of the 
hammer or in any other customary manner. 
In A.V. Thomas & Co. V. Dy. Commissioner of Agricultural 
Income Tax & Sales Tax, Trivendram^, it was held that 
on the fall of the hammer, the offer is accepted and the 
goods (if specific) become the property of the buyer. 
The question as to v/hen does the property in goods by 
auction passes to the auction purchaser depends for deci-
sion upon the facts and circumstances of each case and 
the intention of the parties. 
In Badri Prasad V. State of M.P." on an interpretation 
of the contract and the relevent rules together with the 
instructions issued thereunder, it was held that the sale 
was finalised on the date of the auction sale subject to 
the acceptance of the bid by the competent authority. 
In 
of 
M/S Chowringhee 
Income Tax, West 
Sales Bureau Pvt. 
Benga in the 
Ltd. V. 
instant 
Commissioner 
; case the 
(5) A.I.R. 1964, S.C. 569. 
(6) A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 58. 
(7) A.I.R. 1973, S.C. 376. 
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chowringhee sales bureau pvt.Ltd. ca r r ied on the business 
of auctioneers and col lected from the auction purchases 
not only the p r i ce of the goods sold in auct ion, but also 
s a l e s tax on such sa l e s which amounted to Rs. 32,986 during 
t h e accounting year 1959-60. The company did not pay over 
the amount co l l ec ted to the owners of the goods sold by 
i t i n auct ion nor refunded the amount to the auct ion purch-
a s e r s . The income tax off icer included the t o t a l income 
of the company for the assessment year 1960-61. The 
a p p e l l a t e a s s i s t a n t commissioner and the appe l l a t e t r ibuna l 
excluded the amount and the High court came to the conclu-
s ion t h a t the exclusion vas not c o r r e c t . The assessee 
company, t he re fo re , came to Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court upheld the High Court 's dec i s ion . The court held tha t 
a sa le by auct ion was a sale as contemplated by the sale 
of Goods Act, 1930, and where t r a n s a c t i o n i s one of Sale 
of goods as known t o law, the power of the l e g i s l a t u r e to 
impose a tax thereon, i n our view, i s plenary and unres-
t r i c t e d subject only to any l i m i t a t i o n which might have 
been imposed by the Government of India Act or the Consti-
tu t ion" .® 
In Consolidated Coffee Ltd. V. Coffee Board Bangalore , 
t h e fac t s were t h a t under the Coffee Act, 1942, coffee can 
(8) Id . a t 379. 
(9) A . I .R . -1980, S.C. 1468. 
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be exported either by the Coffee Board created under the 
Act, or by a person authorised by it. The board maintains 
a list of registered exporters who can bid at auction 
known as export auctions conducted by it from time to 
time. 
The question for consideration was whether the sale 
becomes complete in the sense of property in the goods 
passing to the bidder at an auction in view of sub Sec.2 
of Sec. 64 saying, "the sale is complete when the auctio- . 
neer announces its completion by the fall of hammer or 
in other customary manner and until, such announcement is 
made any bidder may retract his bid". The court observed 
these words suggest that what is complete at the fall of 
hammer or the announcement of closure in other customary 
manner is that the contract of sale is complete. On facts 
the Supreme Court found that, the property in the coffee -
sold at the export auction passed to the buyer not at the 
fall of the hammer but immediately after payment of its 
full price, weightment and setting apart for delivery 
In other Words.''^ 
"It is clear that parties intended that the passing 
of property shall not take place till the full price is 
paid and the coffee sold to him is weighed and set apart 
for delivery". 
(10) Id. at 1494. 
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In M. Lachia Satty And Sons Ltd. V. The Coffee 
Board Bangalore, ^'^  the Coffee Board conducted auction 
sale of 315 lots of coffee of various grades and quality 
on October 7, 1952. The appellants were also bidder for 
various lots on October 7, 1952 these bidder orally with-
draw their bids and also sent telegrams withdrav/ing their 
bids but their requests were ignored and their bids 
accepted and the result of auction anounced on October 8, 
1952. The appellants interalia contended that since they 
had revoked the bids, the same could not be accepted. 
It was found that the oral revocation was not valid since 
it was not made to the proper authority and telegraphically 
revocation was invalid in view of condition of sale read 
as follows : 
"Telegraphic bids or telegraphic instructions 
regarding bidding will not be considered". 
The Supreme Court found the appellants were, there-
fore, held to be bound by the contract and for the conse-
quential damages for breach of contract and further held 
seller does not bind himself to accept a highest or any 
bid. It was the implied condition of the auction sale. 
So the seller may accept any lower bid, and therefore, 
acceptance of lower bid creat a valid contract. 
(11) A.I.R. 1981, S.C. 162, 
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[in contracts of sale, amount of increased or decre-
12 
ased taxes to be added or deducted, Section 64 A, 
(i) Unless a different intention appears from the terms 
of the contract, in the event to any tax of the nature 
decribed in sub-section (2) being imposed, increased, 
decreased or remitted in respect of any goods after . 
the making of any contract for the sale or purchase of 
such goods without stipulation as to the payment of 
tax where tax was not chargeable at the time of making 
of the contract, or for the sale or purchase of such 
goods taxpaid where tax was chargeable at the timeJ 
(a) if such in position or increase so takes 
effect that the tax or increased tax, as the 
case may be, or any part of such tax is paid 
or is payable, the seller may add so much to 
the contract price as will be equivalent to 
the amount paid or payable in respect of such 
tax or increase of tax, and he shall be entitled 
to be paid and to sue for and recover such addi-
tion, and; 
(b) if such decrease or remission so takes 
(12) Substituted by Act 33 of 1963, Section 5, for the 
form.er Section which was inserted by Act 41 of 1940, 
Section 2. 
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effect that the decreased tax only, or no tax, 
as the case may be, is paid or is payable, the 
buyer may deduct so much from the contract 
price as will be equivalent to the decrease of 
tax, or remitted tax, and he shall not be 
liable to pay, or be sued for, or in respect 
of such deduction. 
(ii) The Provision of Sub-Section (1) apply to the 
following taxes, namely i 
(a) any duty of custom or excise on goods; 
(b) any tax on the sale or purchase of 
goodsH 
In U/^ Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. V. Union 
of India, "^ the Supreme Court said that this section 
provides for the recovery by the seller of the amount of 
increase in duty from the purchaser where the increase 
takes effect subsequent to the contract and for the right 
of of the purchaser to recover from the seller the duty 
in cases where there is a similar decrease and this right 
exists both before the delivery is given or taken and 
price received or paid, as the case may be. 
(13) A.I.R. 1962, S.C. 1006. 
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In brief, a sale by auction is a sale where various 
intending buyers make their offers to purchase the goods 
by making successive bids, the bidder compete with each 
other and each successive bid or offer for the purchase of 
the goods is higher than the previous one. The goods are 
sold to highest bidder whose bid the auctioneer accepts. 
The sale is complete when the auctioneer announces its coro-
letion by fall of hanmer or in other customary manners. 
Since the contract arises only when the auctioneer accepts 
the bid (offer) by announcing its completion, the bidder 
may retract his bid until such announcement is made. 
***** 
*** 
* 
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CONCLUSION _ 
The law relating to sales should, so far as 
possible and except when local conditions prevent, be 
uniform in the commercial v;orld specially in the 
countries which have trade with one another. In the 
modern v/orld, with quick means of communication and 
expeditious transport, this need for uniformity increases. 
A brief history of the law of sales in common law 
countries convinces us that this branch of law was sub-
stantially the same in all those countries. 
The law of the sale of goods is a fundamental law 
and the needs of merchants are substantially similar 
whether it is in one country or the other. The Law Commi-
ssion of India, in its 6^^ Report, considered whether 
amendments were necessary to the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 
1930. It recommended in all six amendments three of 
which are formal: (i) dropping of the word "Indian" in 
the title of the Act occuring in Sec. 1(1); 
(ii) making of the application of Sec. 64A subject to a 
contract to contrary and (iii) introduction of new clause 
Sec. 64B under which Sec 64A is made applicable to taxes 
on the sale or purchase. The other amendments arises out 
of conflicts of judicial opinion in India. The first is 
I'Sb 
with reference to the definition of the term "goods". 
This amendment suggests the introduction of the word 
"electricity water and gas" in the definition of goods 
in sub Section 2(7). Consequent upon the recommendations 
of the Law Commission some amendments were made in the 
Sale of Goods Act in 1963 but some how Section 2(7) has 
been allowed to remain unamended. 
But, the Supreme Court in the Commissioner of 
Sales Tax, M.P. V. M.P. Electricity Board has held that 
although electric energy is not tangible or can not be 
touched like a piece of wood or book, it is still 'goods' 
as it can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, 
possessed in the same way as any other movable property. 
The Supreme Court further said through Shelat J. that if 
there can be sale and purchase of electric energy like 
any other movable object we see no difficulty in holding 
that electric energy was intended to be covered by the 
definition of "goods". 
From the decided cases by the Supreme Court, it 
is -necessary, in order to constitute a sale, that there 
should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose 
of transferring titles to goods, which of course presuppo-
sed capacity to contract, that it must be supported by 
money consideration, that as a result of transaction. 
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The property must actually pass in the goods. 
The development of modern law with the influence 
of political and economic theories magnified the weakness 
of freedom of contract. A new thinking that absolute 
freedom of contract led to shrinking of economic freedom, 
produced gross inequalities, was taking place with the 
beginning of the twentieth century- In some cases there 
may be statutory regulations for the supply of goods. If 
a supplier supplies the goods under a statutory compulsion, 
whether that results in a contract of sale or not is the 
question. The majority of the Supreme Court in New India 
Sugar Mills V. Commissioner of Sales Tax observed that 
supply of sugar by a sugar factory in compliance with the 
orders of the sugar controller of India did not result in 
a contract of sale of goods. But Hidaytullah J. in his 
dissenting judgment observed that in such a case there was 
implied contract of sale between the parties. Both the 
majority and minority judgments have been supported in 
successive years and two schools of thoughts developed : 
One, under the influence of lais.sez faire philosophy, 
strictly adhered to the majority view, and the other, 
conscious of the new and changing trends, followed the 
progressive approach of Hidayatullah J. 
In the law relating to contracts for the sale of 
goods, the passing or transfer of property constitutes the 
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most important element. According to the Principles of 
Common Law, the risk of loss of, or deterioration or 
damage to the goods, as well as most of the other vital 
consequences inherent in a transaction or sale, are 
generally dependent on the ownership in the goods. The 
rights of the parties, therefore, are normally considered 
as governed by the passing of property, rather than as 
flowing from the various stages of performance of the 
contract. According to the provisions of the Act, the 
transfer of property in goods, is governed by the inten-
tion of parties. Where this intention is not expressed 
certain presumptions apply (a) In case of specific goods 
in a deliverable state if the contract is unconditional, 
property passes as soon as the contract is entered into 
(b) In case of specific goods, if the seller has to do 
something to put them in a deliverable state, property 
passes only when such thing is done and notice thefeof 
is given to the buyer. (c) In case of specific goods in 
a deliverable state if the seller has to do something to 
them for the purpose of ascertaining the price, property 
will pass only when such act is done and notice thereof 
is given to the buyer. (d) In case of unascertained or 
future goods sold by description, property passes only 
when goods according to description are unconditionally 
appropriated to the contract, (e) Delivery to a carrier 
the seller not reserving right of disposal under (S.25) 
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• amounts to an unconditional appropriation. Furthermore, 
risk prima facie passes with the property. 
It is the duty of the seller to deliver the 
goods and of the buyer to accept and pay for them, in 
accordance with the terms of the contract of sale. The 
parties are free to decide and bring out in their agree- . 
ment the place of delivery of the goods. In a c.i.f. 
contract the seller is supposed to despatch the goods 
after paying insurance and freight charges & send the 
documents of title to the buyer. In some mercantile 
contracts it is stipulated that the seller shall deliver 
the goods, "f.o.b." that is free on board or "f.o.r." 
that is free on rail. These words mean that the seller 
J^ _^jgut the goods on board a ship or on some railway, as 
his own expense on account of the person for whom they 
are shipped or consigned by rail the price includes the 
cost of the goods and all expenses that may be incurred 
upto the delivery of the goods to the shipping authori-
ties or the railway, and as soon as the goods ordinarily, 
unless a different intention appears, at the risk of the 
buyer the seller has performed his duty when the goods 
have been put on board or on rail. 
It has been seen that if a sellers offers for 
delivery defective goods, or goods which donot answer to 
the contract, the buyer has a option whether to accept 
14: 
delivery or not. The position is however altered after 
the buyer has accepted delivery. But even though the 
goods have been delivered into the possession of the 
buyer, the performances of the seller's duties may 
still be incomplete by reason of the breach of some of 
the conditions or warranties, express or implied, whether 
as to title, or quality, or fitness, to which he has bound 
himself by the contract. 
If a warranty of title or of quiet possession 
and enjoyment is broken, the buyer is entitled to recover 
from the seller all losses directly and naturally arising 
from the breach of warranty. But a buyer complaining of 
a breach of warranty must have acted on the warranty and 
acted reasonably to mitigate the effects of the breach, 
that is taken reasonable steps tet minimise the damages. 
He cannot recover more than he would have suffered if he 
had acted in a reasonable manner with a view to lessen 
the loss, because any further damages do not reasonably 
flow from the defendant's breach. 
A sale by auction is a sale where various inten-
ding buyers make their offers to purchase the goods by 
making successive bid. The Supreme Court observed in 
Consolidated Coffee Ltd. V. Coffee Board, Bangalore, 
that the sale is complete when the auctioneer announces 
14a 
i t s completion by the f a l l of hammer o r i n o ther cus to-
mary manner* Since the contract a r i s e s only when the 
auc t ionee r accepts the offer by announcing i t s comple-
t i o n , the bidder may r e t r a c t h is bid u n t i l such announ-
cement i s made. 
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